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Structural Racism in the Workplace 
William M. Wiecek* 
Judy L. Hamilton∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Since 1967, sociologists have produced a compelling body of 
literature on structural racism that explains why severe racial 
disparities persist throughout American society in all social 
domains: employment, education, residential patterns, wealth 
accumulation, and so on. Structural racism perpetuates the effects 
of past, overt discrimination because it does its work through 
organizational procedures and social policies that appear to be race 
neutral. Dealing with structural racism requires us to focus on 
social structure instead of the intentions of bigoted individuals.  
In this Article, we link the disciplines of sociology and 
constitutional history to demonstrate that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has refused to recognize the reality of structural racism in the 
workplace. Instead, the Court has developed legal doctrines that 
protect this hidden form of racism, assure its continuation, and 
disable other branches of the federal and state governments from 
eradicating it. The Court’s willful blindness toward race and 
employment ignores the reality of structural racism and instead 
embeds the justices’ unacknowledged racial policy preferences into 
constitutional law. Their doctrinal assumptions about intent, 
colorblindness, facial neutrality, and white innocence enable them 
not just to ignore structural racism but to perpetuate and affirm it. 
In this Article, we first review the sociological literature on 
structural racism and construct a template of structural racism by 
identifying its six key components: (1) irrelevance of intent, (2) 
individualism, (3) belief in structural neutrality, (4) colorblindness, 
(5) white advantage, and (6) invisibility. We then provide examples 
of structural racism in the social domain of employment. Next we 
demonstrate how Supreme Court constitutional decisions regarding 
employment since 1964 map onto this template of structural racism: 
(1) the Court demands a showing of intent, (2) the Court insists on 
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the notion that racism is inflicted only by individuals upon 
individuals, (3) the Court persists in its belief in structural 
neutrality, (4) the Court’s anti-classification understanding of equal 
protection is merely a judicial formulation of colorblindness, (5) the 
Court’s concern for white innocence reaffirms white advantage and 
white normativity, and (6) the Court’s embrace of all five of these 
components serves to keep structural racism invisible and thereby 
further maintains it. 
We conclude first that the Court has ignored nearly a half-
century of substantial research in sociology and instead has clung to 
outdated assumptions about how racism operates that perpetuate 
racial inequality. Second, we find that at the same time, the Court 
does invoke structural social understanding—by ignoring intent, 
being attentive to group actions and effects on groups, and focusing 
on inadvertent effects of institutional policies and procedures—but 
does so only to protect whites’ interests.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and particularly Title VII,1 was a 
product of its time, that time being the Civil Rights Era (1954–
1970).2 It was the signature piece of legislation for that period, just 
                                                                                                             
 1. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Title VII is 
currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 2. Historians refer to this period as the “Second Reconstruction.” See 
generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 
1098 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the signature legislation of the 
first Reconstruction.3 The 1964 Act, like Brown v. Board of 
Education in 1954,4 addressed itself only to the problem of explicit 
racism: intentional, conscious discrimination on the basis of race by 
which African Americans5 were deliberately excluded from 
opportunities and benefits that whites enjoyed. The U.S. Supreme 
Court readily accepted the statute’s legitimacy at first,6 as well as 
that of its successors, the Voting Rights Act of 19657 and the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.8 This trilogy of Civil Rights Acts constituted 
the statutory heart of the Second Reconstruction.  
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a noble achievement, but it did 
not comprehend issues of structural racism.9 Congress did not then 
                                                                                                             
1974); MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–2006 (2007); ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 
(1988); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999); Harvard Sitkoff, 
The Second Reconstruction, 8 WILSON Q. 48, 48–59 (1984). This is a shorthand 
allusion to the following thesis: In the first Reconstruction, a tragically short 
period of time that lasted from 1862 until 1877, all branches of the federal 
government moved toward a racially egalitarian society. See MARABLE, supra, at 
3–11. This movement was stymied by the counterrevolution known as 
“Redemption,” which not only halted the drive toward equality but also imposed a 
successor regime, Jim Crow, a comprehensive structure of race control and labor 
coercion that southern white supremacists created to provide a substitute for 
slavery. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 184 (2006). By an eerie historical parallel, a comparable 15-year 
period, the Second Reconstruction of 1954–1970, again witnessed an attempt by 
the federal government to create a genuinely egalitarian society. See MARABLE, 
supra, at 3–11. It too was cut short by a second Redemption, in which, as in the 
first, the U.S. Supreme Court played a leading role. See J. Morgan Kousser, The 
Supreme Court and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction, 80 NAT’L F. 25, 
25–31 (2000). That role is the subject of this Article. 
 3. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
 4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. The seeming focus on African Americans and lack of attention to Latinos, 
Asian Americans, or Native Americans in the selection of opinions for this Article 
is not deliberate on our part but arises from the Supreme Court decisions 
themselves. The selected opinions happen to feature African Americans because 
the overarching patterns of racialization in our society were initiated with the 
enslavement of African Americans, and African Americans have commonly been 
the focus of legal opinions. 
 6. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964). 
 7. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). But see Shelby 
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 8. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73. 
 9. “Structural racism” refers to the sociological reality that social structures 
can diminish opportunities for people of color in all spheres of life. See infra Part 
II. 
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address problems created by implicit discrimination because social 
scientists had not yet even identified those phenomena or described 
their workings. We can best honor the accomplishments of the 1964 
Act today by carrying forward its egalitarian impetus to attack those 
issues of structural racism that, in 1964, were yet to be understood.  
Slavery, as a system of racial domination and subordination, was 
succeeded by the comprehensive racial regime that we know as 
segregation or Jim Crow, which lasted from the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877 until it began to crumble in the Second 
Reconstruction after 1954.10 Under Jim Crow, whites imposed a 
system of caste that assured the dominant race of superiority in all 
realms: social, economic, political, cultural, and legal.11 White 
supremacy was grounded in explicit racism. “Whites Only” signs 
policed access to public facilities, the white primary assured white 
political power, and segregated schools excluded people of color12 
from all but the most minimal educational opportunity. Meanwhile, 
vagrancy laws, chain gangs, and convict labor created a form of 
crypto-slavery. Segregation ensured that opportunity was reserved 
for whites only and that the lot of the colored races was one of 
inferiority, degradation, and exclusion. Explicit racism—overt, 
deliberate assertions of racial dominance—maintained servitude. It 
was this regime of oppression that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
designed to overthrow. 
As segregation was being dismantled during the Second 
Reconstruction, a third racial regime—structural racism—replaced 
it. In contrast to former slavery and servitude, this new and more 
subtle system of preference and exclusion is maintained by implicit 
racism—covertly arising from nominally impartial structural 
arrangements in society assisted by unconscious biases—which 
assures racially disparate outcomes without the need to rely on overt 
discrimination.13 Neither sociologists nor lawyers had to think much 
about the implications of implicit racism before 1964 because 
explicit racism covered the ground entirely. Racial outcomes were 
wholly determined by overt discrimination, and the operation of 
unseen bias went submerged and unattended.  
                                                                                                             
 10. See WOODWARD supra note 2, 31–65. 
 11. See id. 
 12. A note on usage in this Article: In general, the terms “African Americans” 
or “blacks” are used in a context where the relevant document—constitutional 
amendment, statute, or judicial opinion—refers specifically to them. We use the 
phrase “people of color” in other contexts to indicate that the amendments, 
statutes, opinions, or social conditions have application to all people not of 
exclusively European descent.  
 13. See infra Part II. 
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In this Article, we survey in depth one social domain, the 
workplace, to demonstrate the necessarily time-bound limitations of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its Title VII.14 We do this not to 
critique the vast body of Title VII litigation but rather to 
demonstrate that the cause of racial justice must move beyond the 
Civil Rights Act’s focus on explicit racism and its overt 
manifestations to grapple with implicit racism and its structural 
expressions. 
Though these oppressive social structures and deeply embedded 
racial attitudes are invisible, their effects are all too real. Depressing 
disparities persist between whites and people of color today in all 
social domains. These differences endure despite the efforts of 
activists, Congress, some presidents, courts, and others to close the 
gaps. Public schools across the nation have re-segregated.15 
Traditional, overt racism has receded (though it has by no means 
disappeared), so what can account for the dismal persistence of 
racism’s effects? The answer is structural racism. 
For more than 40 years, sociologists have been producing “an 
enormous body of published, refereed research,”16 both theoretical 
and empirical, that demonstrates the power of social structures to 
diminish opportunities for people of color in all spheres of life.17 
Sociologists call this phenomenon “structural racism” and invoke it 
to explain how and why differential racial outcomes persist in 
American society. Their analyses focus not on the bigoted attitudes 
of individuals but on institutional and structural barriers that people 
of color encounter in all social and economic fields.18 Traditional 
Jim Crow racism may be fading, but social structures perpetuate its 
effects. Policies and procedures that appear on their face to be race 
neutral nevertheless continue to reproduce disparate outcomes.19 
                                                                                                             
 14. This Article deliberately omits consideration of Title VII, concentrating 
instead on the constitutional (as opposed to statutory) dimensions of workplace 
racism. Professor Chambers’s contribution to this symposium amply covers that 
ground. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title 
VII: Strengthening It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161 (2014). This Article 
solely concerns the application of the insights drawn from the social sciences to 
constitutional interpretation, not the role of social science in statutory enforcement.  
 15. JONATHAN KOZOL, SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF 
APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005); GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION (1996).  
 16. Robert L. Nelson et al., Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of 
Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 103, 116 (2008). 
 17. See infra note 23. 
 18. See infra Part II, note 23. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
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This manifestation of racism is unseen, automatic, and self-
propagating. Unacknowledged white self-interest assures that it 
remains both effective and elusive. 
We will demonstrate in this Article that although sociologists 
have provided both theory and data to establish the malignant 
impact of structural racism, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
have ignored these findings and refused to acknowledge this form of 
racism. They have foreclosed most possibilities of mitigating its 
impact on the lives of people of color. Instead, the justices have 
formulated three doctrines—the purpose-impact distinction of 
Washington v. Davis, the white innocence trope, and the modern 
colorblindness principle—that assure structural racism’s continued 
force in our lives and disable other branches of both the federal and 
state governments from uprooting it.20 The Supreme Court 
approaches racial controversies in ways that remove them from their 
social and historical context. The Court mandates instead an abstract 
and formalistic resolution of race-related issues, while inhibiting 
other public institutions from devising realistic solutions to 
inequality.  
In this Article, we combine sociological analysis and 
constitutional history to demonstrate the operation of structural 
racism in a single area of social relations—that of employment.21 In 
Part II, we summarize the sociological understanding of structural 
racism and provide examples of it in the domain of employment. In 
Part III, we review the components of structural racism that manifest 
themselves in the Supreme Court’s major constitutional precedents 
dealing with workplace discrimination since 1964, demonstrating 
how the justices unthinkingly preserve racism and its effects. In 
conclusion, we critique the Supreme Court’s resultant differential 
treatment of blacks and whites. 
II. STRUCTURAL RACISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Most Americans understand racism to be individual, intentional, 
and overt: “crude, explicit, obvious, and motivated by individual 
bias.”22 In this form, it is referred to as “traditional” or “Jim Crow” 
                                                                                                             
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. This Article is a preliminary component of a larger work in progress that 
describes the interaction of structural racism and equal protection doctrine since 
1964. In that larger study, we canvass four selected social domains that impact 
quality of life: employment discrimination, educational opportunity, housing 
segregation, and wealth accumulation. Space limitations confine us to focusing on 
only one of them, workplace inequality, in this piece.  
 22. D. Wellman, Unconscious Racism, Social Cognition Theory, and the 
Legal Intent Doctrine: The Neuron Fires Next Time, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
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racism. It describes the discriminatory attitudes and behavior of an 
individual toward others who are different in skin color or ethnicity. 
However, sociologists have demonstrated for more than four 
decades that the phenomenon of racism is more complicated than 
simply the deliberate, bad-attitude behavior of individuals.23 They 
                                                                                                             
SOCIOLOGY OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 40, 40 (Hernán Vera & Joe 
Feagin eds., 2007). 
 23. See STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: 
THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (1967); LOUIS L. KNOWLES & 
KENNETH PREWITT, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 5 (1969); ROBERT 
BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA 9−10 (1972); JOE R. FEAGIN & 
CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 14−15 (4th ed. 
1993); MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A 
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 43 (2003). For a chronological progression of sociological 
understanding of how racism is embedded in social structures, see generally 
PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(1967); Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market, 
37 AM. SOC. REV. 547 (1972); WILLIAM J. WILSON, POWER, RACISM, AND 
PRIVILEGE: RACE RELATIONS IN THEORETICAL AND SOCIOHISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (1973); Mark Chesler, Contemporary Sociological Theories of 
Racism, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 21 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1975); 
Edna Bonacich, Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Relations in the United 
States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 34 (1976); DAVID 
T. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM (1977); Jonathan H. Turner & Royce 
Singleton, A Theory of Ethnic Oppression: Toward a Reintegration of Cultural 
and Structural Concepts in Ethnic Relations Theory, 56 SOC. FORCES 1001 
(1978); RODOLFO ALVAREZ & KENNETH G. LUTTERMAN, DISCRIMINATION IN 
ORGANIZATIONS (1979); J. M. Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing 
Reality, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS (Benjamin P. Bowser & 
Raymond G. Hunt eds., 1986); PHILOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY 
RACISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY  (1991); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD 
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 
1990S (1994); Joe Feagin & Clairece Feagin, Theoretical Perspectives in Race and 
Ethnic Relations, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS ON 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE (F. Pincus & H. Ehrlich eds., 
1994); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE 
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995); Fred L. Pincus, 
Discrimination Comes in Many Forms: Individual, Institutional, and Structural, 
40 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 186 (1996); Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-Faire 
Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler Anti-Black Ideology, in RACIAL 
ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. 
Martin eds., 1997); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a 
Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465 (1997) [hereinafter Bonilla-Silva, 
Rethinking Racism]; Lawrence Bobo et al., From Jim Crow Racism to Laissez-
Faire Racism: An Essay on the Transformation of Racial Attitudes in America, in 
BEYOND PLURALISM: THE CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND GROUP IDENTITIES IN 
AMERICA (Wendy F. Katkin et al. eds., 1998); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE 
SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001) [hereinafter 
BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY]; D. Pager & H. Shepherd, The Sociology of 
Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and 
Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181 (2008); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, 
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have identified structural racism as founded in ordinary, day-to-day 
practices of organizations, like business firms and government 
agencies, and resulting from social policies produced by political 
decisions.24 An example would be the funding of public schools 
primarily through local private property taxes.25 These practices and 
policies are not consciously maintained because someone 
deliberately intends to discriminate on the basis of race (though they 
may have originated with that objective in mind). Thus on the 
surface they appear to be race neutral. But these policies reduce 
opportunities and outcomes for people of color, for example, by 
diminishing the quality of education in schools attended by their 
children. What is sociologically significant here is not anyone’s 
intent to discriminate but rather the non-intended effects of decisions 
that do not on their face implicate race. “Structural racism” is the 
phrase that sociologists currently use most frequently to describe the 
negative impact on people of color that is the product of ostensibly 
race-neutral policies within and among institutions.26 Sociologists 
have also referred to this by other phrases: “institutional racism,”27 
“structural discrimination,”28 “systemic racism,”29 and “racialized 
social systems.”30  
                                                                                                             
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter BONILLA-
SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS]. We cite here the relevant social science 
literature at what might seem to some readers superabundant length. We do this 
deliberately, to drive home the point to a legal audience that the sociological 
understanding of structural racism is massively established and has been for four 
decades. Legal discourse ignores this consensus at its peril. We also hope that 
these references might prove useful to those litigating workplace discrimination. 
We do not, however, make any claim that our citation of the social science 
literature is exhaustive.  
 24. KNOWLES & PREWITT, supra note 23, at 187−88; Chesler, supra note 23, 
at 42; Pager & Shepherd, supra note 23, at 196; Barbara F. Reskin, Including 
Mechanisms in Our Models of Ascriptive Inequality: 2002 Presidential Address, 
68 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 12 (2003); Vincent J. Roscigno, Power, Revisited, 90 SOCIAL 
FORCES 349, 360 (2011) [hereinafter Roscigno, Power, Revisited]; George 
Wilson, Racialized Life-Chance Opportunities Across the Class Structure: The 
Case of African Americans, 609 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 215, 225 
(2007).   
 25. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS 5–55 (1991); Erin E. Kelly, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The 
Inequitable Combination of Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and 
Local Control, 45 DUKE L. J. 397, 397 (1995). 
 26. See supra note 23. 
 27. CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 23, at 4; KNOWLES & PREWITT, 
supra note 23, at 4; ALVAREZ & LUTTERMAN, supra note 23, at xii. 
 28. Fred L. Pincus, From Individual to Structural Discrimination, in RACE 
AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND 
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In contrast to traditional racism, structural racism focuses on 
differential effects arising from non-intentional causes. For example, 
African Americans, as a group, have elevated blood lead levels as a 
result of their higher likelihood of living in older housing that is 
contaminated with lead-based paint; this has serious health 
consequences, especially for children.31 This racial disparity occurs 
because of social (and material) structures, yet it has important 
health, education, social, and economic outcomes. The impact of 
this type of racism is cumulative and is part of a dynamic process 
that takes place across social domains and over long periods of 
time.32  
In all social domains—education, housing, income, 
employment, wealth, health, environmental degradation, and 
criminal justice—differential effects appear in racial disparities that 
persist and in many cases even grow more pronounced over time. 
People of color, when compared to whites with otherwise equivalent 
characteristics, have higher death rates from disease33 and higher 
                                                                                                             
ETHNOVIOLENCE 84 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1994); Pager & 
Shepherd, supra note 23. 
 29. Sheri Lyn Schmidt, More Than Men in White Sheets: Seven Concepts 
Critical to the Teaching of Racism as Systemic Inequality, 38 EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE EDUC. 110, 116 (2005); J.R. FEAGIN, SYSTEMIC RACISM: A THEORY 
OF OPPRESSION (2006). 
 30. OMI & WINANT, supra note 23; BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY, 
supra note 23, at 37, 193; Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism, supra note 23, at 467, 
469. 
 31. See generally Bruce P. Lanphear et al., The Contribution of Lead-
Contaminated House Dust and Residential Soil to Children’s Blood Lead Levels: 
A Pooled Analysis of 12 Epidemiologic Studies, 79 ENVTL. RES. 51 (1998); CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN 
EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 215 (Department of Health and 
Human Services ed., 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf 
/FourthReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/UM4R-QN3D] (archived Apr. 10, 2014); PAUL 
MUSHAK, LEAD AND PUBLIC HEALTH: SCIENCE, RISK AND REGULATION (2011); 
ERIK MILLSTONE, LEAD AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE DANGERS FOR CHILDREN 
(1997). 
 32. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 4−5, 
11 (Rebecca M. Blank et al. eds., 2004). This study was prepared for the National 
Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, by a panel of 
distinguished social scientists and may be fairly taken to represent a widely shared 
understanding among social scientists of the nature of racism and its measurement. 
 33.  
A higher percentage of black women (37.9%) than white women (19.4%) 
died before age 75 as a result of CHD, as did black men (61.5%) 
compared with white men (41.5%). The same black-white difference was 
seen among women and men who died of stroke: a higher percentage of 
black women (39%) died of stroke before age 75 compared with white 
women (17.3%) as did black men (60.7%) compared to white men 
(31.1%).  
2014] STRUCTURAL RACISM IN THE WORKPLACE 1105 
 
 
 
infant mortality rates,34 have lower high school graduation rates,35 
suffer higher unemployment,36 are unemployed for longer periods,37 
experience more frequent episodes of joblessness,38 experience less 
stable employment,39 and accumulate less skill and on-the-job 
training than whites with comparable human capital.40 All of these 
factors compound job experience deficits41 and accrue into 
substantial race differences in earnings over a lifetime.42 People of 
color work in lower-paying occupations than whites with otherwise 
equivalent characteristics,43 have lower median household income44 
                                                                                                             
OFFICE OF THE DIR., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FACT SHEET—
CDC HEALTH DISPARITIES AND INEQUALITIES REPORT—U.S. 2011 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/reports/CHDIR11/FactSheet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QH9V-WE5Q] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 34. “The highest infant mortality rate was for non-Hispanic black women 
with a rate 2.4 times that for non-Hispanic white women. Analysis on trends and 
variations in infant mortality reveals not only considerable differences in infant 
mortality rates among racial/ethnic groups but the persistence of disparities over 
time.” Id. at 2. 
 35. “Across the United States, the AFGR [Averaged Freshman Graduation 
Rate] was highest for Asian/Pacific Islander students (93.5 percent). The rates for 
other groups were 83.0 percent for White students, 71.4 percent for Hispanic 
students, 69.1 percent for American Indian/Alaska Native students, and 66.1 
percent for Black students.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, PUBLIC 
SCHOOL GRADUATES AND DROPOUTS FROM THE COMMON CORE OF DATA: 
SCHOOL YEAR 2009–2010, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013309 
/findings.asp [http://perma.cc/FSV4-VLUP] (archived Apr. 10, 2014).  
 36. The unemployment rate for blacks is consistently more than twice that for 
whites. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ECON. NEWS 
RELEASE, TABLE A-2: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BY 
RACE, SEX, AND AGE, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit 
.t02.htm [http://perma.cc/PF4R-V648] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 37. Average duration of unemployment is considerably longer for black 
workers (44.9 weeks average duration) and Asian workers (45 weeks) than for 
white workers (37.7 weeks). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 
TABLE 31: UNEMPLOYED PERSONS BY AGE, SEX, RACE, HISPANIC OR LATINO 
ETHNICITY, MARITAL STATUS, AND DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT (2013), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat31.htm [http://perma.cc/7B87-4S4T] (archived 
Apr. 10, 2014). 
 38. Marta Tienda & Haya Stier, Generating Labor Market Inequality: 
Employment Opportunities and the Accumulation of Disadvantage, 43 SOC. 
PROBS. 147, 147, 162 (1996). 
 39. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Race and the Accumulation of Human 
Capital Across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Application, 
111 AM. J. SOC. 58, 62−63 (2005). 
 40. Id. at 85.  
 41. Tienda & Stier, supra note 38, at 149, 162−63. 
 42. Tomaskovic-Devey et al., supra note 39, at 64, 82. 
 43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE EDITOR’S 
DESK, EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX 
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and higher poverty rates,45 and accumulate significantly lower levels 
of wealth.46 Such racial disparities provide an urgent reminder that 
people of different races are still not on a level playing field.  
Structural racism identifies the cause of such racial disparities in 
the processes, procedures, policies, historical conventions, 
assumptions, and beliefs regarding operational functioning that 
occur within, between, and among the social institutions that make 
up a society’s infrastructure. It is the result of institutional 
arrangements that distribute resources unequally and inequitably.  
Structural racism explains unequal racial outcomes by focusing 
not on prejudiced individual behavior but on social infrastructure.47 
A society’s infrastructure is made up of all the various and 
interrelated institutions that affect people’s lives and social 
                                                                                                             
(2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110914.htm [http: 
//perma.cc/PF4R-V648] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 44. Median income in 2011 dollars for whites alone, not Hispanic, was 
$55,412; for blacks alone, $32,229; American Indian and Alaska Native alone, 
$32,625; Asian, $65,129; Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander, $50,806; 
Hispanic, $38,624. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: 
HOUSEHOLDS, TABLE H-16: INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN USING 3-YEAR AND 2-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE MEDIANS (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household 
/index.html [http://perma.cc/93SR-L9UP] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 45. In 2011, the percentage of blacks aged 18 to 64 years old that were below 
poverty was 24.1%; Asians, 11.9%; Hispanic of any race, 21.1%; whites alone not 
Hispanic, 9.8%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES–PEOPLE, 
TABLE 3: POVERTY STATUS OF PEOPLE, BY AGE, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 
1959 TO 2011, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data 
/historical/people.html [http://perma.cc/6BX3-78CD] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). In 
2010, the poverty rate for black children, 38.2%, was twice as high as that for 
white children, 17%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILD POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2009 AND 2010: SELECTED RACE GROUPS AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 3–4 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-05.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6UT8-FC6V] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). For Hispanic children, the 
poverty rate was 32.3%; for Asian children, 13.0%. Id. 
 46.  
The median wealth of white households [($113,149)] is 20 times that of 
black households [($5,677)] and 18 times that of Hispanic households 
[($6,325)], according to a Pew Research Center analysis of newly 
available government data from 2009. These lopsided wealth ratios are 
the largest since the government began publishing such data a quarter 
century ago and roughly twice the size of the ratios that had prevailed 
between these three groups for the two decades prior to the Great 
Recession that ended in 2009.  
RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS: 
TWENTY-TO-ONE (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26 
/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics [http://perma 
.cc/D6PS-F2LZ] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 47. See supra note 23. 
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relationships. A metaphorical comparison may help here. In the 
same way that our transportation physical infrastructure is made up 
of roads, bridges, railroads, ports, and airports, our social 
infrastructure consists of institutions such as schools, courts, 
hospitals, homes, and workplaces. Structural components of both of 
these kinds of infrastructures have a significant, but often unseen, 
impact on people’s lives. To illustrate: the interstate highway system 
has helped to drastically reduce auto fatalities.48 The fatality rates 
for both urban and rural interstates have been significantly lower 
than those for all other categories of highways every year.49 Because 
of structural features such as overpasses, divided roadways that 
separate opposing traffic by median strips, and uniform signage and 
markings, traveling on interstate highways is safer than traveling on 
two-lane roads. This is not because individual drivers on secondary 
roads are worse drivers and certainly not because those drivers 
intend to cause accidents or nurture hostile attitudes toward other 
drivers. Rather, the different outcomes are due entirely to structural 
features. The drivers’ states of mind are irrelevant. In the same ways 
that motorists on secondary roads are impacted by structural features 
such as intersections and proximity to oncoming traffic, so are 
people of color affected by social structural features such as 
dependence on local property taxes for public school funding, 
reliance on social networks for job information, subjective decision-
making that is affected by unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, 
and business decisions made for rational, profit-oriented reasons.  
In a racialized society, racial groups are related to each other by 
systems of domination and subordination, and social institutions are 
both structured by and contribute to the maintenance of the racial 
order.50 Racialization is “a set of conditions and norms that are 
constantly evolving and interacting with the socio-political 
environment,” mutating over time and space.51  
The earliest inquiries into the structural nature of racism focused 
on institutions. The term “institutional racism” first appeared in 
                                                                                                             
 48.  See BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABLE 2-
18: MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITIES, VEHICLE-MILES, AND ASSOCIATED RATES BY 
HIGHWAY FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM, available at http://www.bts.gov/publications 
/national_transportation_statistics/#chapter_2 [http://perma.cc/L2HY-SSQZ]  
(archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 23, at 79; Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking 
Racism, supra note 23, at 476; BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 
23, at 11, 12, 67. 
 51. john a. powell, Post-racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DEN. U. L. 
REV. 785, 785–86 (2009). 
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1967 in the writing of Stokely Carmichael52 and Charles V. 
Hamilton, who argued that “[i]nstitutional racism . . . is less overt, 
far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of specific individuals 
committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human life. [It] 
originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the 
society, and thus receives far less public condemnation.”53 They 
reinforced this with a compelling illustration: 
When . . . five hundred black babies die each year because of 
the lack of proper food, shelter and medical facilities, and 
thousands more are destroyed and maimed physically, 
emotionally and intellectually because of conditions of 
poverty and discrimination in the black community, that is a 
function of institutional racism . . . . It is institutional racism 
that keeps black people locked in dilapidated slum 
tenements, subject to the daily prey of exploitative 
slumlords, merchants, loan sharks and discriminatory real 
estate agents. The society either pretends it does not know of 
this latter situation, or is in fact incapable of doing anything 
meaningful about it.54 
African Americans have been injured more by the day-to-day 
operation of institutions like schools and the job market in the past 
three decades than they have been by the deliberate actions of 
bigoted white individuals. Sociologists have demonstrated that not 
only could racial disparities result from the regular functioning 
within institutions, but racial inequalities could also result from 
interactions between institutions within a social domain such as 
employment, education, health, wealth, law, and even among 
institutions across social domains.55 Our understanding of the 
                                                                                                             
 52. Sometime around 1969, when Carmichael went into self-imposed exile in 
Ghana, he adopted the name Kwame Toure to honor his African patrons Kwame 
Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. We use his Trinidadian birth name because it is more 
familiar to general readers and that is how it is universally catalogued. 
 53. CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 23, at 4. 
 54. Id.  
 55. FEAGIN & FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 23; 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) [hereinafter 
MASSEY & DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID]; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 32, at 223−46; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 23; Timothy Bates, Circular 
Causation in Social Processes: The Case of the Ghetto and Black-Owned 
Businesses, in NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSES OF 
DISCRIMINATION (Richard R. Cornwall & Phanindra V. Wunnava eds., 1991); 
T.A. DiPrete & G.M. Eirich, Cumulative Advantage as a Mechanism for 
Inequality: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Developments, 32 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 271, 291 (2006); George C. Galster, A Cumulative Causation Model of the 
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cumulative effect across social domains reaches back to Gunnar 
Myrdal’s explication of the cumulative causation principle,56 where 
“there is no single ‘cause’ [of urban poverty], but rather a web of 
mutually reinforcing connections in which elements serve both as 
causes and effects.”57 
Structural racism crops up in all social domains: housing,58 
health and medical care,59 wealth accumulation,60 employment,61 
                                                                                                             
Underclass: Implications for Urban Economic Development Policy, in THE 
METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE (George C. Galster & Edward W. Hill eds., 
1992); Mark D. Hayward et al., The Significance of Socioeconomic Status in 
Explaining the Racial Gap in Chronic Health Conditions, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 910 
(2000); Phillip Lovell & Julia Isaacs, The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on 
Children, FIRST FOCUS (2008), available at http://www.firstfocus.net/library 
/reports/impact-mortgage-crisis-children [http://perma.cc/5PUG-C8AZ] (archived 
Apr. 10, 2014); Pager & Shepherd, supra note 23; David F. Warner & Mark D. 
Hayward, Early-Life Origins of the Race Gap in Men’s Mortality, 47 J. HEALTH & 
SOC. BEHAV. 209 (2006); David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, Racial 
Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 
116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404 (2001). 
 56. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 75−77 (1944). 
 57. Galster, supra note 55, at 191.  
 58. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 55; 
Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and Housing Markets: Findings 
and Challenges, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (William 
M. Rodgers ed. 2006); Rick Cohen, A Structural Racism Lens on Subprime 
Foreclosures and Vacant Properties (2008), available at http://www.kirwan 
institute.osu.edu/reports/2008/10_2008_StucturalRacismandSubprimeRickCohen. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/9Q66-9SWZ] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 59. DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A 
NATION (1999); DALTON CONLEY ET AL., THE STARTING GATE: BIRTH WEIGHT 
AND LIFE CHANCES (2003); Arline T. Geronimus, To Mitigate, Resist, or Undo: 
Addressing Structural Influences on the Health of Urban Populations, 90 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 867 (2000); Naa Oyo A. Kwate, Racial Segregation and the 
Marketing of Health Inequality, in BEYOND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN A POSTRACIST ERA (Rodrick C. Harris & Robert C. Lieberman 
eds., 2013); Vernellia R. Randall, Racial Discrimination in Health Care in the 
United States as a Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45 (2002); 
Williams & Collins, supra note 55; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNEQUAL 
TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 
(2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10260 [http: 
//perma.cc/Q8FT-D69D] (archived Apr. 10, 2014).  
 60. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, 
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA (1999); MEIZHU LUI, THE COLOR OF WEALTH: 
THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE (2006); OLIVER & 
SHAPIRO, supra note 23; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING 
AFRICAN AMERICAN; HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004). 
 61. BLAUNER, supra note 23; BROWN ET AL., supra note 23; BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 23; ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK 
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1995); MASSEY & DENTON, 
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income,62 taxation,63 environmental justice,64 and transportation,65 
among others. Scholars have identified the structural basis of racism 
in such fields as education,66 criminal justice,67 economics,68 
                                                                                                             
AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 55; Nelson et al., supra note 16; Pager & 
Shepherd, supra note 23; Vincent J. Roscigno et al., Social Closure and Processes 
of Race/Sex Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 16 (2007) [hereinafter Roscigno, Social Closure]; Steven Shulman, The 
Causes of Black Poverty: Evidence and Interpretation, 24 J. ECON. ISSUES 995 
(1990) [hereinafter Shulman, The Causes of Black Poverty]; Steven Shulman, Why 
is the Black Unemployment Rate Always Twice as High as the White 
Unemployment Rate?, in NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
ANALYSES OF DISCRIMINATION (Richard R. Cornwall & Phanindra V. Wunnava 
eds., 1991) [hereinafter Shulman, Why is the Black Unemployment Rate Always 
Twice as High as the White Unemployment Rate?]; Gregory D. Squires, 
Demobilization of the Individualistic Bias: Housing Market Discrimination as a 
Contributor to Labor Market and Economic Inequality, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 200 (2007). 
 62. MEIZHU LUI ET AL., INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECONOMIC DEV., LAYING 
THE FOUNDATION FOR NATIONAL PROSPERITY: THE IMPERATIVE OF CLOSING THE 
RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2009), available at http://www.insightcced.org/uploads 
/CRWG/LayingTheFoundationForNationalProsperity-MeizhuLui0309.pdf  
[http://perma.cc/PTP8-N6KL] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 63. Douglas S. Massey, Globalization and Inequality: Explaining American 
Exceptionalism, 25 EUR. SOC. REV. 9 (2009); LUI ET AL., supra note 62. 
 64. ROBERT D. BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (1994); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: 
RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (2000); ROBERT D. BULLARD, THE 
QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
POLLUTION (2005); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT (2001); Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, 
Structural Pollution and the Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y. 265 (2006). 
 65. JACOB FABER ET AL., ONE REGION: PROMOTING PROSPERITY ACROSS 
RACE (2009), available at http://www.centerforsocialinclusion.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2012/07/One_Region_Promoting_Prosperity_Across_Race_FINAL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WS7S-V4ZP] (archived Apr. 10, 2014); ROBERT D. BULLARD ET 
AL., HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM AND NEW ROUTES TO 
EQUITY (2004); Raymond A. Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, 
Housing, and the Freeway Revolt, in POVERTY AND RACE RESEARCH ACTION 
COUNCIL (2002), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/mohl.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/8CQ6-QHF3] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 66. KOZOL, supra note 25; ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 15; GARY ORFIELD 
& C. LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL 
INEQUALITY (2005); Linda Darling-Hammond, The Flat Earth and Education: 
How America’s Commitment to Equity Will Determine our Future, 36 EDUC. 
RESEARCHER 318 (2007); Lovell & Isaacs, supra note 55.  
 67. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); R. J. SAMPSON & J. L. LAURITZEN, Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, in 
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political science,69 urban geography,70 philanthropy,71 and, of 
course, law.72 
A. Components of Structural Racism 
Structural racism has numerous components, but six comprise its 
core: (1) the irrelevance of intent to discriminate; (2) the ideology of 
individualism; (3) belief in structural neutrality; (4) the normativity 
of white advantage; and (5) the myth of colorblindness. Uniting all 
of these is (6) the invisibility of structural racism. 
                                                                                                             
ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES (M. H. Tonry ed., 1997). 
 68. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 23; Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A 
Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 
(2004); Shulman, The Causes of Black Poverty, supra note 61; Shulman, Why is 
the Black Unemployment Rate Always Twice as High as the White Unemployment 
Rate?, supra note 61.  
 69. ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: NOW YOU 
SEE IT, NOW YOU DON’T (1995); R. C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: 
RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998). 
 70. Catherine L. Ross & Nancey Green Leigh, Planning, Urban 
Revitalization, and the Inner City: An Exploration of Structural Racism, 14 J. 
PLAN. LITERATURE 367 (2000); JOHN W. FRAZIER ET AL., RACE AND PLACE: 
EQUITY ISSUES IN URBAN AMERICA (2003); ROBERT D. BULLARD, THE BLACK 
METROPOLIS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS OF 
PLACE (2007). 
 71. Keith Lawrence, Reconsidering Community Building: Philanthropy 
Through a Structural Racism Lens, in 4 SOULS: A CRITICAL JOURNAL OF BLACK 
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 45 (2002); JULIE QUIROZ-MARTINEZ ET AL., 
GRANT MAKING WITH A RACIAL EQUITY LENS (2007). 
 72. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331 (1988); John Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at 
Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067 (1998); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law]; Alan Freeman, 
Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, 
Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
(David Kairys ed. 1998); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace 
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, 
Toward a Structural Racism Framework, POVERTY & RACE, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 3; 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 
(2006). 
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1. Absence of Intent 
A principal difference between individual racism and structural 
racism is the role of intent. As the sociologist Fred Pincus observed, 
“[T]he key element in structural discrimination is not the intent but 
the effect of keeping minority groups in a subordinate position.”73 
Individual racism is intentional: A bigot means to cause harm to 
another because of skin color or ethnicity. However, when 
sociologists analyze structural racism, intent is irrelevant.74 Though 
occasional outbursts of old-style, intentional racism flare 
disturbingly often, “more often racism consists of routine acts of 
everyday racism that are not viewed as racist by the person 
performing them and therefore are not intentional. It is this 
unintentional racism . . . that produces a good deal of institutional 
racism and resulting racial inequality.”75  
Professor john powell has described structural racism as an 
example of a complex system of interconnected relationships and 
processes that operates according to the principles of systems 
theory,76 where causation is not singular, autonomous, and linear but 
is instead cumulative over time as well as within and across social 
domains.77 Viewing racism through the lens of systems theory, 
where causation involves “elements of dynamic complexity such as 
accumulations, time delays, and other nonlinearities,” highlights the 
senselessness of legal insistence on causation by individuals’ 
intent.78 Professor powell uses another systems example, that of the 
ecological understanding of climate change, to point out the futility 
of trying to place responsibility on individuals alone for problems 
like structural racism or global warming, noting that both result in 
                                                                                                             
 73. Pincus, supra note 28, at 84. 
 74. KNOWLES & PREWITT, supra note 23, at 5; Chesler, supra note 23, at 45; 
BLAUNER, supra note 23, at 9–10, 187−88; FEAGIN & FEAGIN, supra note 23; 
Pincus, supra note 28, at 84; Robert Blauner, Talking Past Each Other: Black and 
White Languages of Race, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS 
ON PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 18, 21 (Fred L. Pincus & 
Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1984); BROWN, supra note 23, at 43; SMITH, supra note 
59, at 33, 53; Pager & Shepherd, supra note 23, at 199. 
 75. BARBARA TREPAGNIER, SILENT RACISM: HOW WELL-MEANING WHITE 
PEOPLE PERPETUATE THE RACIAL DIVIDE 3−4 (2006). 
 76. The scholar acknowledged to be the originator of systems theory provided 
a remarkably accessible and humanistic introduction to the subject: LUDWIG VON 
BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, 
APPLICATIONS 3–53 (rev’d ed. 1968). On its relevance to the social sciences, see 
john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 795–96 (2007). Note that Professor powell does not 
capitalize his name. 
 77. powell, supra note 76, at 795−96.  
 78. Id. 
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serious harm because of “cumulative and mutual actions of many 
actors and institutions.”79 Just as requiring a showing of intent to 
cause global warming is pointless for collective action in responding 
to climate change, it is useless for reforming the structural bases of 
racial inequities. “A systems approach changes the focus from 
assigning culpability to solving a problem and redressing a harm. 
Parties may be called upon to address harms they may not have 
directly caused or intended to cause.”80 
Racial disparities arise without intent through institutional and 
social policies that are meant to be race neutral.81 They are 
implemented by well-intentioned people but nevertheless perpetuate 
and exacerbate racial inequality. Researchers in a related discipline, 
psychology, have found that unconscious bias plays a significant 
role in thought processes and behavior, and they have thereby 
buttressed the sociological argument that intent is not a requisite 
component of racism.82 Social psychologist Susan Fiske describes 
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these biases as “unconscious, subtle biases, which are relatively 
automatic, cool, indirect, ambiguous, and ambivalent.”83 Social 
psychologists have demonstrated that the notion of intent does not 
accurately describe how people actually think and act; they 
demonstrate that unconscious racial biases84 play a causal role in 
perpetuating inequality. 
Negative racial attitudes and perceptions persist in the culture 
and are learned and reinforced at unconscious levels. These 
unconscious beliefs and associations continue to shape people’s 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses in automatic and 
uncontrollable ways. Unconscious stereotypes are pervasive, predict 
behavior, vary from one person to another, and affect the judgments, 
perceptions, and actions of people even when they believe 
themselves to be free of bias or prejudice.85 Individuals may 
consciously disavow racist attitudes and sincerely support the 
general goal of racial equality, yet harbor submerged mental 
associations that link people of color with laziness, crime, poverty, 
drugs, violence, immorality, and a host of other negative racial 
stereotypes.86 Conscious ideals and unconscious imagery coexist in 
unacknowledged tension. These unrecognized negative attitudes 
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affect their holder’s behavior, and this regularly produces 
discriminatory outcomes that are not intentional.87 All people in our 
culture cannot help but breathe this cultural air pollution, thereby 
absorbing these negative racial attitudes and perceptions. Thus, 
people of color also absorb cultural negative images of themselves, a 
concept described as “internalized subordination.”88 
Since people are not consciously aware of their unconscious 
biases, psychologists have developed indirect techniques of 
measuring them, most commonly using priming and latency 
methods.89 The priming method consists of showing a word or 
image to the subject very briefly before beginning a task. The 
primed word or image is shown so briefly that it cannot be 
consciously recognized, so the prime is subliminal.90 Research 
demonstrates that racially primed subjects are more likely to 
consistently produce racially stereotypical judgments and 
behaviors.91 The most common latency method is the Implicit 
Association Test in which target concepts are paired with attributes 
on a computer that measures speed at categorizing words or 
images.92 The subject is to match a pairing of, for example, a 
racially identifiable name (e.g., “Betsy” or “Ebony”) and a pleasant 
or unpleasant concept (e.g., “Flower” or “Poison”) with the 
appropriate category of “Black–Pleasant,” “Black–Unpleasant,” 
“White–Pleasant,” or “White–Unpleasant.”93 Subjects invariably are 
faster at identifying the pair of concepts when “Black” is matched 
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with “Unpleasant” (e.g., “Ebony–Poison”) and “White” with 
“Pleasant” (e.g., “Betsy–Flower”) even when they express no black–
white preference on explicit measures.94 Psychometric studies in the 
field of psychology disclose racial biases in persons who are not 
only unaware of them but are disturbed to find that they hold them.95 
The authors of these studies have concluded that a majority of white 
Americans harbor unconscious and unwanted negative associations 
about blacks.96  
The extensive evidence presented by psychologists on 
unconscious prejudices is important beyond its confirmation of 
sociological findings that intent is irrelevant to structural racism. 
Unconscious prejudices play a role in structural racism because they 
can be a factor in organizational processes—which are structured on 
the assumption that decision-making is always conscious and 
rational—that lead to racial disparities. Unconscious prejudices 
conflict with conscious attempts to be neutral or objective. 
In the employment area, this unconscious–conscious conflict can 
play a role in the evaluation of resumes of potential employees, 
potential employees’ performances in interviews, and current 
employees’ performances toward promotion.97 For example, an 
employer may perceive a job candidate to be competent but feel 
some reservations that he or she cannot pinpoint consciously and 
therefore decides against hiring that person. Or someone perceived 
as racially different may be simultaneously respected (consciously) 
but disliked (because of unconscious stereotypes), as frequently 
exemplified by whites’ reactions to black professionals.98 The 
conflict between unconscious prejudices and conscious attempts to 
be neutral can result in confusing interactions where nonverbal 
(unconscious) behavior conflicts with verbal messages. For 
example, our body language may not match what we are saying in 
words.99 This mismatch of unconscious body language and 
conscious verbal communication can cause social discomfort, the 
origin of which is impossible to articulate. When this happens in the 
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workplace, such as in a job interview, it could often be the people of 
color who are held responsible for the discomfort. 
Unconscious–conscious conflict can produce discomfort that 
may lead to racial avoidance,100 which in turn can lead to a hostile 
work environment. Racial avoidance also makes it difficult to even 
talk about racial issues, which further exacerbates racial tensions in 
workplaces and society generally.  
The unconscious–conscious conflict is likely to influence 
decisions in ambiguous situations101 or decisions that must be made 
under time pressure.102 Sociologist Lincoln Quillian suggests that 
the time pressure to make a “quick decision may prevent conscious 
inhibition of stereotype activation” as may occur in the urgency of a 
police officer’s decision of whether to shoot at what may appear to 
be a threatening subject.103 Other occupations are often associated 
with factors that decrease cognitive capacity as well, such as fatigue, 
information overload, and time pressure in the provision of 
healthcare.104 While some evidence suggests that it may be possible 
under certain conditions to reduce unconscious stereotypes,105 it is 
far from clear that interventions are capable of producing lasting 
change. Indeed, Banaji and Greenwald observe that unconscious 
bias appears to be “dauntingly persistent.”106 
Social psychologists have been refining their research on 
unconscious bias for several decades.107 The reality of unconscious 
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bias is so well established by extensive research that understanding 
of it has permeated other disciplines including economics,108 
sociology,109 neuroscience,110 and of course law.111 In addition, 
several books have recently appeared for non-academic audiences 
that discuss how the human brain functions beyond conscious 
awareness including the absorption of stereotypes and their impact 
on behavior.112 It is disturbing to contemplate that general audiences 
understand this concept while some Supreme Court justices 
apparently cannot.  
Thus, from a sociologist’s perspective, reinforced with findings 
from psychology, any legal doctrine that mandates intentional 
discrimination as a sine qua non for a finding of a constitutional 
violation, or as a prerequisite for judicial relief, will by definition 
miss all instances of structural racism. No matter how egregious the 
social reality, any court maintaining such a posture is thereby 
protecting the continued oppression caused by structural racism.  
2. Individualism 
Individualism has long been identified as an essential element of 
the American character,113 and this powerful American tradition 
contributes to a common belief that social phenomena are nothing 
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more than the aggregate of individuals’ actions. “Because white 
America’s strong belief in ‘rugged individualism’ has such a long 
history, public sentiment in the United States favors individual 
initiative over social and economic structures as an explanation for 
poverty and welfare.”114 Our understanding of racial disparities has 
long been dominated by this atomistic approach. This has produced 
two antithetical ways of accounting for racial disparities. The first 
blames white individuals’ intentional racial prejudices. The second 
condemns individual people of color for being incompetent, 
ignorant, or lazy. This second understanding assigns blame to 
individual victims for being morally, culturally, or psychologically 
flawed. Numerous studies confirm that such stereotypes about 
people of color persist today.115 The one thing these two disparate 
explanations have in common is that they are both individual 
oriented—that is, they assume that individuals have effective control 
of their lives—and ignore structural forces that shape peoples’ 
chances in life, forces that are beyond the control of individuals. 
One of the earliest explorations of structural racism identified 
this individualist bias with a clarity that has not since been 
surpassed: 
For too long American society has believed in the 
mythology that social ills are in truth nothing but the 
aggregate of individual defects. If a black man is 
unemployed or uneducated or poorly housed, it must be due 
to some failure to ‘achieve’ on his part. Or, if we do not 
directly place blame on his character defects, we suggest that 
there is some prejudiced employer or inadequate teacher or 
bigoted realtor who is bringing about the condition . . . . 
Some social ills are not adequately explained by simply 
alluding to individual defects. There are social ills which are 
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structured into the very operations of the society, which are 
inevitable given the institutional arrangements.116  
Viewing the problem of racial disparities through an individual-
oriented lens limits the scope of solutions to those that are similarly 
individual oriented. Such solutions include the unproven belief that 
racial disparities would disappear if only individual whites could 
overcome their prejudices or if only individual people of color 
would become more ambitious, more hard-working, more ethical, 
etc. If we cannot understand the structural causes of racial 
disparities, we will not be able to see the possibilities of structural 
solutions. 
3. Belief in Structural Neutrality  
Numerous social scientists have described the third component 
of structural racism, the apparent neutrality built into social 
structures that appears on the surface to be neutral, but in fact, 
affects people of color in harmful ways.117 Our social structures 
frequently have devastating negative consequences on communities 
of color, even though the ways in which these structures operate 
appear neutral on the surface and have no intent to harm. There are 
several ways in which neutral social structures operate to reproduce 
racial disparities. First, historical events can be embedded in present 
circumstances in such a way that processes that otherwise might be 
neutral act to perpetuate disparate racial outcomes. Race-neutral 
economic decisions can be detrimental to poor people generally. 
Because such a high percentage of people of color are poor,118 such 
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decisions also have adverse racial consequences.119 For example, 
because of historical racial segregation, the seemingly neutral policy 
of financing public schools primarily through local private property 
taxes has a racially differential effect resulting from the wealth 
disparities between taxing districts.120 Second, decisions made on 
purely economic grounds can produce racial disparities, as when 
grocery store chains decide not to locate stores in poorer 
neighborhoods, contributing to neighborhood food environments 
that provide challenges to healthy eating, in turn contributing to 
higher risk of obesity, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes.121 
Similarly, decisions made for non-racial public policy reasons can 
inadvertently have racial outcomes, such as including an 
incarcerated population in the census district in which the prison is 
located instead of the inmates’ home districts, resulting in 
overrepresentation of some white rural communities and 
underrepresentation of communities of color in state legislatures.122  
Lastly, internal organizational processes can also have negative 
racial outcomes, even though the intent of organizational actors is to 
be neutral.123 Organizations provide “contexts in which ostensibly 
race-neutral policies can structure and reinforce existing social 
inequalities.”124 Organizational policies and procedures, while 
intended to be neutral, nevertheless allow for discretionary judgment 
on the part of supervisors. As described above, unconscious 
prejudices affect everyone. Unconscious prejudices on the part of 
supervisors can result in “disparate policing of minority employees” 
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who are watched “more closely and sanctioned more often and 
severely” than whites.125 Such targeted workplace bullying is often a 
matter of following organizational procedures.126  
Likewise, unconscious prejudices are embedded in “assumptions 
regarding dependability, presentability, communication skills, and 
work ethic,” and employers using ostensibly neutral criteria in hiring 
and promotion decisions exercise subjective discretion as they 
“invoke a relatively flexible set of filters for ‘who fits the job best’ 
and ‘who might be best for the promotion.’”127 Because Vincent J. 
Roscigno repeatedly found superficially neutral organizational 
policies that result in significant racial disparities, he wrote that we 
should “reconsider foundational assumptions of much sociological 
work relative to structure and agency, [and] the supposed neutrality 
of bureaucratic organizational forms.”128 
Just as with internal organizational processes, entire social 
domains can depend on supposedly neutral processes and 
procedures that negatively affect people of color and advantage 
whites. We will provide examples of this in the social domain of the 
law in our discussion of the 1989 cases in Part III. 
4. White Advantage and White Normativity 
When white Americans do become aware of racial disparities, they 
perceive people of color to be “disadvantaged” relative to some neutral 
social norms. Thus we speak of “racial disadvantage” or 
“underprivileged” to describe racial disparities. But the opposite side of 
the disadvantaged/underprivileged coin is advantaged/privileged.129 
Sociologist Peggy McIntosh wrote, “As a white person, I realized I 
had been taught about racism as something which puts others at a 
disadvantage, but had been taught not to see one of its corollary 
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 126. Id. at 41. 
 127. Id. at 31, 41. 
 128. Roscigno, Power, Revisited, supra note 24, at 360. 
 129. The word “privilege” can suggest conscious intent; it thereby provokes 
strong negative reactions that interfere with dialogue and understanding across 
race lines. The resulting swarm of uncomfortable connotations, including guilt and 
self-justification, often prevents whites from considering the advantage–
disadvantage dichotomy. For these reasons, we use the phrase white advantage, 
though the phrase “white privilege” is more commonly encountered. See HALLEY 
ET AL., SEEING WHITE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WHITE PRIVILEGE AND RACE 
(2011); PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE 
OTHER SIDE OF RACISM (2008). The current controversy over “check your 
privilege” nicely illustrates the perils of attributing privilege. Marc Santora & 
Gabriel Fischer, At Princeton, Privilege is: (a) Commonplace, (b) Misunderstood 
or (c) Frowned Upon, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A15. 
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aspects, white privilege which puts me at an advantage.”130 McIntosh 
describes white advantage as “an invisible weightless knapsack of 
special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools 
and blank checks” that she can count on cashing in every day.131  
A simple, everyday example of disadvantage for people of 
color—and of corresponding advantage for whites—is the 
underlying assumptions about skin color in “nude” hosiery, in 
adhesive bandages, and in crayons labeled “flesh.” Such products 
match European rather than African skin tones. For whites, finding 
products that do match their skin color is so common, so natural and 
appropriate, that it seems normal, and it never occurs to them that it 
is an advantage. Conversely, people of color may be reminded that 
their skin color is not considered “normal” every time they seek 
products that approximate their own. This white advantage is 
difficult for whites to see because for them it is normal.  
Another example of white normativity involving skin color can 
be seen in the text accompanying a picture of First Lady Michelle 
Obama wearing a gown designed for a White House state dinner in 
November 2009, which was widely disseminated in print media. 
The dress designer initially described the gown’s color as “nude,” 
while the Associated Press referred to it as “flesh” colored.132 But 
accompanying pictures in news stories offered stark visual evidence 
of the underlying misassumption that white skin should be the 
default or norm. In response to reader objections to this assertion of 
white normativity, subsequent descriptions employed truly race-
neutral terms like “peach-toned” or “champagne” to describe the 
gown’s color.133  
This unrecognized sense of normality contributes to the 
invisibility of white advantage and thus of structural racism. While 
these simple examples of unthinking media bias do not account for 
the great variety of racial disparities, they do convey the assumption 
of normality entertained unthinkingly by most whites in other areas. 
More egregious consequences flow from assumptions that all-white 
schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and churches are “normal.” 
                                                                                                             
 130. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, 
49 INDEP. SCH. MAG. 31, 31 (1990). 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Lisa Wade, Stunning Example of the Neutrality of Whiteness, SOC’Y 
PAGES (Nov. 27, 2009, 10:58 AM), http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2009 
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http://jezebel.com/5540784/why-a-nude-dress-should-really-be-called-champagne 
-or-peach [http://perma.cc/583E-BEFY] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 133. Wade, supra note 132; Stewart, supra note 132. 
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Structural factors invariably ensure that such all-white institutions 
are significantly better resourced, yet whites generally are not aware 
of their advantaged positions.  
More examples of white advantage come from McIntosh’s 
invisible knapsack and relate to employment: being able to take a 
job with an affirmative action employer without having coworkers 
suspect that the hiring was because of race; having a bad day at 
work and not wondering whether each negative episode has racial 
overtones; doing well in a challenging work situation without being 
called “a credit to your race”; not being expected to speak for all the 
people of your racial group; when pulled aside by the boss, knowing 
you have not been singled out because of your race; leaving work 
meetings feeling that you are a welcome member of a team rather 
than feeling isolated, out-of-place, outnumbered, unheard, held at a 
distance, or feared; or making occasional mistakes at work without 
having them attributed to the bad morals, ignorance, or illiteracy of 
your race.134 
5. Colorblindness  
Colorblindness, the fifth component of structural racism, is an 
aspiration based on the belief that everyone, white people as well as 
people of color, should not care about race, or even notice it, in our 
dealings with each other.135 At the individual level, this is 
admirable, and most people do try to treat others with equal respect.  
Although this may be a commendable personal goal, it cannot 
end racial disparities for two reasons. First, the evidence presented 
by psychologists described above indicates that our conscious intent 
cannot override our unconscious programming. Second, 
colorblindness actually fuels structural racism because it keeps us 
from noticing racial disparities and their structural causes. 
Colorblindness “‘white-washes’ the racial status quo” because white 
people of goodwill who understand racism only as intentional 
prejudice may exempt themselves from responsibility for their 
participation in the structural system by taking comfort in their own 
benevolent attitudes toward people of color.136 Sociologists and 
psychologists have demonstrated that a purposeful intent to 
discriminate is a narrow and unrealistic view of the reality of 
racism.137 A purposeful intent not to discriminate—that is, to be 
                                                                                                             
 134. McIntosh, supra note 130. 
 135. See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
 136. BROWN, supra note 23, at 64.  
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colorblind—is a similarly narrow and unrealistic view of how to 
combat racism. Colorblindness as an approach to end racism cannot 
succeed because it encourages people to act only at an individual 
level and thereby blinds them to their organizational and social roles 
in perpetuating structural racism.  
The colorblindness ideal leads to socially destructive extremes. 
If we try to be blind to race, we may then try not to talk about race 
or consciously use race in our thinking. The result is that the 
colorblind ideal avoids the use of race even to counteract racial 
inequality (such as hiring practices that aim for equal opportunity or 
the collection of racial data in the Census). But racism is implicated 
in any action that sustains racial hierarchy and racial inequality, 
whether it involves injuring people of color or favoring whites. 
Avoiding thoughts about race in an effort to be completely 
colorblind is in reality, therefore, paradoxically racist, perhaps 
inadvertent but all the more effective for that. 
President John F. Kennedy once said, “[T]he great enemy of 
truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—
but the myth—persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.”138 Kennedy 
aptly described the situation facing us as we struggle to attain racial 
equality. The myth of colorblindness is the great enemy of racial 
equity. On its face, colorblindness seems like a morally appropriate 
response. In reality, colorblindness is a powerful myth that keeps 
structural racism firmly in place.  
6. Invisibility 
The structural arrangements that perpetuate racial disparities are 
so embedded within the social infrastructure that they appear normal 
and thus effectively invisible to someone who does not know how to 
look for them. Thus, the fact that they produce racial inequalities 
goes unnoticed. Because of the high levels of segregation in housing 
and the workplace in our society,139 white Americans are generally 
                                                                                                             
 138. John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address, Yale University (June 11, 
1962), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3370 [http: 
//perma.cc/CQQ3-TLBC] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). Kennedy went on to say, “Too 
often we hold fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all facts to a 
prefabricated set of interpretations. . . . We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the 
discomfort of thought.”  
 139. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE 
UNITED STATES: 2011 (2013), available at  http://www.census.gov/content/dam/ 
Census/programs-surveys/ahs/data/2011/h150-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/9VKX-
6FLJ] (archived May 18, 2014); see generally Judith K. Hellerstein & David 
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1126 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
not exposed to racial disparities in their day-to-day lives and are thus 
often unaware of the extensive harm caused to people of color. 
Therefore, white Americans can believe that the playing field is 
level, while Americans of color know keenly that is not the case. 
People tend to ignore issues that do not negatively impact their own 
lives. Racial issues are usually not salient for white people, so they 
disregard racial issues and assume that those issues are not 
important.  
Each of the facets of structural racism contributes to its 
invisibility and thus to its perpetuation. The obsolete and deeply 
flawed idea that racism is exclusively a product of intent allows 
structural racism to escape notice.140 Individualism prevents us from 
noticing social structures.141 Belief in the neutrality of social 
structures enables those structures to perpetuate racially disparate 
outcomes.142 The normativity of white advantage keeps it 
invisible.143 Colorblindness and its current incarnation, post-
racialism,144 share a false belief that the playing field is now level, 
thus keeping us from comprehending the reality of severe racial 
disparities in quality of life and seducing us into believing that race-
based decision-making or race-based remedies are unnecessary.145 
All of these facets contribute to the invisibility of structural racism, 
and the invisibility in turn contributes to its perpetuation.146 
B. Structural Racism in the Employment Context 
Because structural racism is pervasive yet unseen, a detailed 
(though non-exhaustive) review of how it functions in one particular 
social domain, employment, is both necessary and useful to 
demonstrate how it simultaneously privileges whites and operates to 
exclude or impede blacks’ access to its benefits. We will review 
examples that occur within organizations, as well as instances of 
structural racism that occur in the recruitment process, the hiring 
process, and that continue once people are on the job. 
                                                                                                             
 140. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 141. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 142. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 143. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 144. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2009). 
 145. See supra Part II.A.5. 
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1. Information About Job Opportunities Is Disseminated 
Primarily Through Social Networks 
Many people obtain jobs through social contacts such as 
relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Because of widespread 
segregation in American society (residential, educational, 
occupational, and social), people of color are less likely to hear 
about job openings because white social networks have few 
connections with black ones and vice versa.147 Recruiting new 
workers via word-of-mouth through friends and friends-of-friends 
has a racial impact yet is “passive and unobtrusive. One need not be 
a racist to use one’s position to benefit friends and 
acquaintances.”148 A natural inclination toward bias in favor of 
one’s “ingroup” has as its correlative a disinclination to take chances 
on hiring a member of an “outgroup.”149 “Being white is a resource 
in the sense that it provides access to a segregated network of 
information, trust, and privilege,” Steven Shulman wrote.150 
Because whites and blacks live in largely segregated neighborhoods 
and move in different social circles (fraternal and civic 
organizations, bowling leagues, churches, garden clubs, sports 
teams, and other private associations), “they have different access to 
information about jobs, most of which is circulated informally. 
Furthermore, they have differential access to those in charge of 
allocating jobs, almost all of whom are white.”151  
2. Information About Job Opportunities Is Disseminated 
Selectively 
Even when employers expand their recruitment efforts beyond 
social networks, they may undertake selective recruitment practices 
to avoid targeting populations they believe to consist of less 
                                                                                                             
 147. Nelson et al., supra note 16, at 111; BROWN, supra note 23, at 18; Trond 
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desirable workers. These selective recruitment practices consist of 
advertising only in suburban neighborhood papers and avoiding 
metropolitan newspaper advertisements, posting job notices only at 
suburban or private schools, and avoiding recruitment through state 
employment and welfare programs.152  
3. Candidate Requirements Structurally Discriminate When 
Unrelated to Necessary Job Skills 
When a job can be performed successfully by a person without a 
college degree and there is no direct connection between a college 
education and the skills required for the job, the requirement that an 
employee have a college degree discriminates against people of 
color, who are less likely to have one.153 Similarly, requiring 
previous job experience can screen out people of color in industries 
historically dominated by whites.154 Requiring good credit histories 
of job applicants structurally discriminates against people of color 
who are more likely to have faced financial obstacles in trying to 
pay bills or have not been able to build up credit histories because of 
other structurally discriminatory practices.155  
4. Stereotypes About Group Characteristics Affect Perceptions 
of Job Candidates 
Most whites perceive people of color through a filter of 
unconscious assumptions (described above as unconscious bias) 
about dependability, presentability, communication skills, and work 
ethic.156 For example, blacks are viewed as different from whites in 
terms of language skills.157  
White job applicants often fare better than job applicants of 
color with equivalent credentials. One well-known study, where 
fictitious resumes randomly assigned with African-American- or 
white-sounding names were sent to help-wanted ads in Boston and 
                                                                                                             
 152. Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial 
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 153. Pincus, supra note 28, at 84–85. 
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Financial Setback Can Be a Long-Term Barrier, NBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010, 8:07 
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Chicago newspapers, found that white names received 50% more 
callbacks for interviews.158 The racial gap in this study was 
consistent across occupation, industry, and employer size.159 In a 
similar study with similar results, racially different job applicants, 
who were matched on demographic characteristics and interpersonal 
skills and given equivalent resumes, were sent to apply in tandem 
for hundreds of entry-level jobs: White testers received callbacks 
and job offers twice as often as black testers.160 Recent studies 
demonstrate that unconscious prejudices play a role in screening job 
applicants161 and interviewing them.162 Yet other studies have 
incorporated the Implicit Association Test as part of the research 
methodology along with the evaluation of resumes, thereby 
documenting the role of unconscious bias in screening.163 “Given 
that many hiring decisions are presumably based on ‘gut-feelings’, 
implicit attitudes and stereotypes, more so than their explicit 
counterparts, may exert a substantial impact on how employers 
contemplate and make decisions regarding human resources.”164  
5. Once in the Labor Force, People of Color Experience 
Discomfort and Stress Through the Social Relations They 
Experience on the Job 
Sociologist Vincent Roscigno describes examples of derogatory 
name-calling, racial slurs, racial jokes, harassment that may or may 
not be explicitly racial, or refusal to provide resources with which to 
accomplish the job that are provided to whites in the same 
position.165 Such behavior “isolates minority employees in their 
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workplaces, undermines their capacity to perform their jobs 
properly, and impacts their sense of dignity in quite meaningful 
ways. Moreover, it reifies racial hierarchy on a daily basis, and in 
ways seldom captured by standard analyses of racial inequalities at 
work.”166  
These behaviors may be instances of overt racism directed at 
people of color in the workplace, but the structural impact arises in 
several ways. For example, diminished job satisfaction may lead to 
reduced job performance, which may affect promotion opportunities 
for the workers of color.167 Reduced job performance by workers of 
color may impact the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organization as a whole. Structural implications also arise when the 
employer does not have appropriate or adequate procedures in place 
to prevent such behaviors and discipline offenders.  
At times, behaviors intended to be positive can be rooted in 
negative racial assumptions, such as perceiving the competent job 
performance of an employee of color as remarkable or offering 
ample praise to subordinates of color while simultaneously 
withholding raises and promotions.168 Workplace incidents seen as 
patronizing disempower workers of color.169 If employees rebuff 
what was meant as a generous gesture, they may be seen as difficult 
or even as troublemakers.170 If they stay silent about what they see 
as patronizing behavior, they suffer emotional stress.171 That stress, 
in turn, may be a factor in the greater turnover in more diverse work 
groups.172  
6. Social Networks Constrain Job Performance 
In addition to the impact of network communication about job 
openings described above, social networks also affect people once 
they are on the job. Segregation of social networks within the 
workplace reduces informal information sharing, which is important 
for newcomers in the workplace for achievement and success.173 
Such segregation also restricts access for people of color to informal 
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mentoring, contacts, and relevant knowledge important for 
advancement.174 
7. Employers Sometimes Apply Seemingly Neutral Workplace 
Policies in a Differential Manner 
Roscigno refers to the application of neutral workplace policies 
in a differential manner as “disparate policing of minority 
employees” and gives these examples: A black employee was given 
a poor performance review for breaking cutters at a metal 
manufacturing facility but white workers had not been held 
accountable for the same infraction; a black worker was fired for 
taking a break in a restricted area when other employees routinely 
took breaks in the same place; a black employee was demoted for 
unauthorized use of a company vehicle when all other employees 
signed out vehicles in the same way for more than 20 years without 
any discipline.175  
8. Supervisors Often Exercise Decision-Making Power Based on 
Subjective Assessments 
In the same way that unconscious negative assumptions affect 
perceptions of job candidates, they can also affect subjective 
assessments of employees of color, thereby reducing the chances of 
promotion. Supervisors are the “gatekeepers” of the workplace and 
wield considerable influence on the careers of subordinates.176 A 
white manager charged with selecting “management material” who 
promotes whites with less experience and seniority to managerial 
positions may well be relying on these unconscious assumptions 
about potential or competence.177 Tristin Green eloquently describes 
the role of unconscious prejudice: “It creeps into everyday 
impressions of worth and assignment of merit on the job, lurking 
constantly behind even the most honest belief in equality, 
perpetuating the very injustice that we decry.”178  
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9. The Seniority System Can Structurally Recreate an 
Organization’s White Workforce Through Lay-Offs 
Because people of color are often among those most recently 
hired and are not among employees with greater seniority, they are 
among those who are first laid off.179 Last-hired-first-fired impacts 
them disproportionately. The seniority system most affects people of 
color in organizations with a history of exclusion accompanying 
recent efforts aimed at inclusion.180 One of the principal cases 
considered in Part III, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
involved just this problem, and the facts of that case provide a 
textbook example of how structural racism operates without 
malignant intent on anyone’s part.181 Seniority-related issues 
provide much of the fodder for the innumerable white firefighters’ 
suits that have become a major vehicle for challenging affirmative 
action programs.182   
Countless instances of all the above examples of structural 
racism in the domain of employment occur in organizations across 
the country. Structural racism in other social domains reduces 
employment opportunities even further. 
10. Job Opportunities Are Often Lost Because of Incarceration 
Due to structural racism in the justice system, blacks are 
imprisoned at rates that far exceed their representation in society 
overall.183  
Nearly 60% of the prison and jail population is African 
American or Latino, far out of proportion to their overall 
share of the national population . . . . [I]f current trends 
continue, one in three black males born today can expect to 
go to prison in his lifetime, as can one in six Latino males.184  
Among the factors contributing to the extreme racial disparities in 
incarceration is the impact of supposedly race neutral policies. 
“[W]hile greater involvement in some crimes is related to higher 
rates of incarceration for African Americans, the weight of the 
evidence to date suggests that a significant proportion of the 
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disparities we currently observe is not a function of disproportionate 
criminal behavior.”185 
The high incarceration rate of black and Latino males means that 
while incarcerated, they are not developing resumes through work 
experiences and are missing educational opportunities that may have 
been stepping stones to employment. They are not in the pipeline to 
take on positions of further responsibility in those occupations in the 
future. In addition to extended absence from routines of work and 
skill building, lengthy exposure to the physical and psychological 
trauma prevalent in prison environments affects an individual’s 
ability to work.186 Incarceration disrupts social and family ties, 
which are crucial to finding a job, and employment opportunities are 
greatly diminished because of overt institutional policies and 
employer assumptions.187 
11. Lack of Education Credentials Diminishes Job Opportunities  
Structural racism in education has resulted in a substantial racial 
disparity in high school graduation188 and dropout rates.189 Racial 
disparities in income levels affect the percentage of high school 
graduates who can afford to go to college. Both impact the racial 
disparity in education credentials of people looking for employment. 
12. Suburbanization Puts Jobs Out of Reach  
“Relocation of employment opportunities to the suburbs created 
a spatial mismatch between inner-city minorities and outer-city 
jobs.”190 Disinvestment and accompanying lack of retail business in 
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communities of color greatly reduce accessible job opportunities. 
Structural racism in transportation exacerbates the difficulty of 
physically getting to work when a job is found: Automobile 
ownership is lower in poor neighborhoods because of cost, and 
public transportation is often underfunded, inadequate, and stressed 
by high demand.191  
These examples of structural racism in employment demonstrate 
multiple ways in which social structures operate to produce racial 
disparities in employment that do not necessitate intentional, 
individual racism. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND STRUCTURAL RACISM IN 
EMPLOYMENT  
Ivan Bodensteiner considers the Supreme Court itself to be “the 
major barrier to racial equality” in America today.192 Girardeau 
Spann believes that “[t]he [Roberts] Court wants to preserve 
existing racial inequalities.”193 At first, such judgments seem harsh 
and extravagant, but sober reflection in the light of the analysis 
below only confirms them. 
Since 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated doctrines 
in the field of workplace discrimination that make it impossible for 
the justices to see structural racism, much less take it into account in 
formulating doctrine. As a rough index of the Court’s myopia, a 
Westlaw search undertaken on March 3, 2014, disclosed that the 
phrase “structural racism” has never appeared in the opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court. Nor do the synonymic phrases 
“aversive racism,” “structural discrimination,” or “systemic racism” 
make an appearance in its opinions.194 Lest we conclude that this 
merely reflects the lack of awareness of social science findings in 
legal scholarship generally, we should note that the search turned up 
350 law review hits for the same phrase, “structural racism,” along 
                                                                                                             
Distribution of Employment Opportunities Across Sub-metropolitan Areas, 19 J. 
POLICY ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT 207 (2000). 
 191. BULLARD ET AL., supra note 65. 
 192. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Supreme Court as the Major Barrier to Racial 
Equality, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 199 (2009). 
 193. Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
431, 432, 449 (2009) (“I have been driven to the conclusion that the Supreme 
Court, as a matter of conscience, considers racial discrimination to be good for 
America. That conclusion offers the only plausible account of the Court’s repeated 
insistence on displacing populist efforts to promote racial equality with the Court’s 
own, more-regressive, version of expedient racial politics.”). 
 194. The sole exception, a reference to “institutional racism” by Justice 
Thomas, is discussed infra note 198.  
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with 219 for “aversive racism,” 407 for “systemic racism,” and 
1,185 for “institutional racism.” 
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated doctrines 
in the field of workplace discrimination that: • lead it to explicitly, resolutely reject what it call “societal 
discrimination” as a basis for legal relief; • ignore entirely the problem of implicit bias; • invent doctrines like the purpose–impact distinction that 
ensconce structural racism as legally protected and 
invulnerable to challenge, so that for constitutional analysis, 
the justices recognize only intent, not effects; • adopt the perpetrator’s perspective rather than the victim’s;  • make judging in the new order formalistic and frequently 
acontextual; • denounce relief aimed at groups and mandate individual-
based remedies; and • disable other institutions, like Congress and the states, from 
eradicating structural racism.  
This has resulted in an inversion of the fundamental values of 
the Civil Rights Era into a witches’ Sabbath of equal protection 
doctrine.195 The Court’s new reading shields racially discriminatory 
effects from constitutional challenge, while the justices condemn 
efforts to achieve true equality and racial justice by taking race into 
account as violative of equal protection. Where the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally meant to 
protect blacks and other people of color from oppression, the Court 
now deploys it to protect whites from threats to white advantage. 
Since 1971, the justices have been extraordinarily obtuse in 
matters of race, particularly structural racism. Most of them do not 
recognize or acknowledge it.196 The Court’s majority has unfailingly 
protected structural racism in cases where it has been challenged, 
especially those involving workplace discrimination. The members 
of the conservative bloc, Chief Justices William H. Rehnquist and 
John Roberts, Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, Lewis 
Powell, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, have gone out of their 
way to confirm the legitimacy of all instances of structural racial 
inequality. They seem to be disciples of Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
who opined that the “Constitution does not require legislatures to 
                                                                                                             
 195. A musical analogy may be suggestive to some: This inversion of values is 
like the degeneration of the beloved motif, the idée fixe, in the first movement of 
Berlioz’s “Symphonie Fantastique” into the grotesque, hideous parody of itself in 
the fifth movement. 
 196. The exceptions were Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, 
the later Harry Blackmun, and David Souter, with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John 
Paul Stevens, and Stephen Breyer frequently joining in. 
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reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards.”197 Justice 
Clarence Thomas has mocked those who seek to devise legal 
remedies for institutional or structural racism as “conspiracy 
theorists.”198 
A landmark moment occurred when the Court first encountered 
the related problem of affirmative action in university admissions. In 
his solo opinion in Regents v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell 
dismissed “societal discrimination” (his phrase for structural racism) 
as “an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach 
into the past.”199 (Why antiquity should justify an injustice he did 
not bother to explain.) He doubled down on that dismissive attitude 
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, insisting that “this Court 
never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to 
justify a racial classification.”200 As a justification for redress, he 
said, it is “insufficient and over expansive.”201 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor repeatedly rejected “societal discrimination” as a basis for 
relief in Richmond v. Croson.202 Chief Justice John Roberts capped 
this refusal to recognize structural racism as a legitimate subject of 
the Court’s concern in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District by insisting with as much finality as he could 
muster that “assertions of general societal discrimination are plainly 
insufficient.”203 These tiresomely redundant claims miss the point, 
perhaps intentionally. Admittedly, generalized racist attitudes at 
large “out there” cannot be a basis for relief, even for a clearly 
proven wrong. But structural racism is something else altogether: a 
proven social reality that harms millions of Americans every day in 
ways that are obvious and have been demonstrated beyond cavil in 
the literature of social science.204 The Court has thereby placed itself 
in the untenable position of rejecting an understanding that for four 
decades has commanded unanimity among social scientists, has 
been validated countless times by empirical studies as we have 
                                                                                                             
 197. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (dictum).  
 198. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(denouncing affirmative action in law school admissions because it might 
“confirm the conspiracy theorist’s belief that ‘institutional racism’ is at fault for 
every racial disparity in our society”).  
 199. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 200. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). See infra 
notes 258–288. 
 201. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
 202. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 471, 473, 497, 499 
(1989).  
 203. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 755 (2007). 
 204. See supra Part II, note 23.  
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demonstrated at length in Part II, and identifies the principal form of 
racial discrimination in American society today. 
What can account for this extraordinary performance? The 
justices are captives of a mindset produced by a conservative 
ideological and political revolution that has taken place since 1964. 
In its doctrinal components, the Court’s race-related cases reinstate a 
Lochnerian formalism that masks a determination by the 
conservative wing of the Court to advance that ideological agenda, 
the program of what Paul Krugman has called “movement 
conservatism.”205  
A. Intent: Washington v. Davis, Feeney, and McCleskey 
In Washington v. Davis, the District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Department administered tests to recruits for the police 
academy that gauged reading ability and comprehension, as well as 
verbal ability.206 The test filtered out a disproportionate number of 
black applicants, and the trial court found that it had not been proven 
to measure subsequent performance on the job.207 It nevertheless 
upheld the use of the exam as non-discriminatory and reasonably 
related to job requirements.208 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit reversed,209 relying on the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
disproportionate impact test (which was a statutory, not a 
constitutional, criterion).210 In Washington v. Davis (1976), the 
Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals, stating that 
“we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends 
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a 
greater proportion of one race than of another.”211 Justice Byron 
White invoked by way of explanation “the basic equal protection 
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose.”212 He linked that to the anti-classification principle, which 
interprets the Equal Protection Clause to forbid any state 
classification by race unless it meets stringent strict scrutiny 
requirements: 
                                                                                                             
 205. PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL ch. 6 (2007).  
 206. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 229–38 (1976). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 232–36. 
 209. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 210. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 211. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.  
 212. Id. at 240. 
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Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the 
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination 
forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not 
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected 
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the 
weightiest of considerations.213 
Justice White did make one concession to civil rights plaintiffs: 
“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it 
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”214 
He admitted that “we have difficulty understanding” how any 
facially neutral statute could be discriminatory simply because it 
generated unequal results, thereby conceding for the first time that 
the Court did not understand the workings of structural racism.215 
(To be fair, sociologists were only beginning to work out the theory 
at that time.216) The triumph of the purpose–impact doctrine 
announced in Washington v. Davis solidified the racial stratification 
of American society. In this sense, it was the Plessy v. Ferguson of 
the 20th century.217 
Washington v. Davis demonstrates the workings of Alan 
Freeman’s distinction between the perpetrator perspective and the 
victim perspective in the law of equal protection.218 Under the 
perpetrator perspective, racial discrimination consists of a willful 
violation of some legally binding norm.219 To show an actionable 
wrong, a civil-rights petitioner must prove the respondent’s 
wrongful intent plus actions by a specific person who committed an 
identifiable discriminatory act.220 In analogous criminal law terms, 
                                                                                                             
 213. Id. at 242. 
 214.  Id. at 242. A year later, the Court identified other indicia of discriminatory 
purpose, thereby slightly easing the burden of proving a prima facie case of 
discrimination, but in dicta Justice Powell’s majority opinion required that the 
disparate effects be “stark” to constitute determinative proof of intent. Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (involving 
exclusionary zoning rather than employment discrimination). 
 215. Washington, 426 U.S. at 245. 
 216. The concept of structural racism began to emerge in sociological 
literature in the works of van den Berghe, and Louis L. Knowles and Kenneth 
Prewitt, published in 1967 and 1969, respectively. See supra note 23.  
 217. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving 
Forms of Status Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).  
 218. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law, supra note 72, at 1052–56.   
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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there must be both mens rea and actus reus.221 The remedy must be 
limited to punishing the violation and be no broader than that 
particular violation.222 This understanding of “discrimination” is 
based on ideas of causation and fault, which sound in tort. There 
must be a blameworthy cause of the harm complained of (the 
discriminatory act), a purpose to discriminate, and a harmful effect 
(a measurable wrong to the victim).223 The perpetrator perspective is 
blind to structural racism because it requires intent, stringently 
defined.224 The victim perspective, on the other hand, looks to the 
effects of societal structures.225 It asks whether the conditions 
complained of (e.g., workplace disadvantage) are the product of 
racial oppression, understood both sociologically and historically.226  
Washington v. Davis had immediate, far-reaching, and 
deleterious effects on civil rights litigation. At the doctrinal level, its 
pernicious purpose requirement metastasized to frustrate Thirteenth 
Amendment badges-of-slavery claims of racial discrimination based 
on anti-black animus227 and voting rights claims based on the 
Fifteenth Amendment.228 It restrained lower courts from vigorous 
civil rights enforcement, thus becoming the foremost setback to the 
movement since 1954.229 It “places the nearly impossible burden of 
proof and persuasion on those who have experienced the exclusion  
 . . . [I]t asks the victim to go into the mind of the perpetrator and 
demonstrate that there exists an unconstitutional motivation.”230 Its 
“discriminatory purpose” requirement severely reduced both the 
volume and the success rates of constitutionally based civil rights 
litigation.231 Few claims based on intent were filed thereafter, even 
fewer were successful, and almost none were awarded damages. At 
the appellate level, virtually no appeals (less than 1%) were 
                                                                                                             
 221. Pamela Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured 
Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 118–28 (1989) (comparing the 
Davis purpose requirement with the criminal standard of mens rea). 
 222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 (2010). 
 223. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law, supra note 72, at 1055. 
 224. Id. at 1054–55. 
 225. Id. at 1052–53. 
 226. Id.  
 227. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 228. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 229. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 326 (1981). 
 230. MARGARET RICHARDSON & TODD L. PITTINSKY, THE MISTAKEN 
ASSUMPTION OF INTENTIONALITY IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SCIENCE AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, in 14 
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT: FACULTY RESEARCH WORKING 
PAPERS SERIES (2005). 
 231. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi 
nation Law, supra note 72, at 1056. 
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successful, while few trial court decisions were appealed.232 The 
resulting disparity between the volume of potential claims (vast) and 
the number litigated to a successful conclusion (few) conforms to 
the Miller/Sarat pyramid model of litigation, with the discouraging 
result that most claims of racial discrimination are not even filed, 
much less won.233 It produced the undesirable and paradoxical result 
that since 1990, an ever-increasing volume of employment 
discrimination litigation results in fewer awards in individual cases: 
more law, less justice. “The typical plaintiff receives neither their 
day in court nor a meaningful remedy.”234 It is at best a system of 
“uncertain justice.”235 The “discriminatory purpose” requirement of 
Washington v. Davis was the object of unanimous contemporary 
criticism,236 and its reputation has not improved over the years.237  
Going beyond Washington v. Davis, the Court raised an almost 
insurmountable barrier to civil rights plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases in a 1979 decision, Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney.238 Plaintiff, a woman, challenged the veterans’ preference 
                                                                                                             
 232. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnston, The Effect of Intent: Do 
We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1991). 
“Plaintiffs infrequently file intent claims. Each year at the district court level, not 
more than one intent claim per district succeeds. . . . [A]t the appellate level, . . . 
fewer than one published appellate opinion per year, per circuit, rules favorably 
for an intent claimant.” Id. at 1176–77, 1193. The volume of Title VII litigation 
increased after 1992 but that was largely due to the rise in non-racial 
discrimination claims. JOHN J. DONOHUE & PETER SIEGELMAN, The Evolution of 
Employment Discrimination Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary Empirical 
Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: 
RIGHTS AND REALITIES, (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2008). 
 233.   Id. (citing R. E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and 
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 (1981)). 
 234. Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Uncertain Justice: Litigating 
Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary U.S., 19 
RESEARCHING L. 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093313 [http: 
//perma.cc/R24V-84PU] (archived Apr. 10, 2014). 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and 
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 
(1977); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Robert Schwemm, From 
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal 
Protection Litigation, U. ILL. L.F. 961 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of 
Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 
72.  
 237. See Gayle Binion, Intent and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 
SUP. CT. REV. 397 (1983); see also David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and 
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). 
 238. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).  
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program of Massachusetts’s civil service hiring practices, which had 
the effect of excluding women from higher echelons of civil service 
and confining them to traditionally female clerical occupations.239 
The Court took up any slack that might have been left in 
Washington v. Davis’s intent requirement by holding that it  
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences. It implies that the decision maker, in this case 
a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course 
of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.240  
Mere awareness of a possible result, no matter how likely or even 
certain that result, is insufficient to prove or even infer motivation. 
For constitutional purposes, this adopted a standard of intent and 
foreseeability greater than the torts negligence standard, something 
closer to malice.241 Tort law draws a distinction between intentional 
torts, where the plaintiff must prove defendant’s intent to commit an 
act that will have particular consequences, and torts of negligence, 
where the standard is that “the person acts knowing that the 
consequence is substantially certain to result.”242 The latest iteration 
of the Torts Restatement offers this example to illustrate this 
negligence concept of intent:  
The Jones Company runs an aluminum smelter, which emits 
particulate fluorides as part of the industrial process. Jones 
knows that these particles, carried by the air, will land on 
neighboring property, and in doing so will bring about a 
range of harms. Far from desiring this result, Jones in fact 
regrets it. Despite its regret, Jones has knowingly, and hence 
intentionally, caused the resulting harms.243  
Similarly, the Model Penal Code provides that an individual 
criminal defendant acts “knowingly” where “he is aware that his 
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist.”244 Why 
are these standards inoperable and irrelevant for equal protection? 
In a contemporary capital sentencing case, McCleskey v. Kemp, 
the Court went even further in exalting intent, making it virtually 
impossible for a defendant of color to prove that a legislature acted 
in a way that made it more likely that he or she would be sentenced 
                                                                                                             
 239. Id. at 260. 
 240. Id. at 279. 
 241. Siegel, supra note 217, at 1135. 
 242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010). 
 243. Id. at cmt. c. illus. 3 (2010).  
 244. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (establishing requirements of culpability). 
1142 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
to death because he or she is not white.245 A person sentenced to 
death must now “prove that the . . . Legislature enacted or 
maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated 
racially discriminatory effect.”246 Moreover, “to prevail under the 
Equal Protection Clause, [defendant] must prove that the 
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”247 
The Court thus moved the goal posts still further away from civil 
rights plaintiffs: On top of the Washington v. Davis purpose 
requirement, a plaintiff under Feeney must show something 
approaching actual malice and under McCleskey that the 
legislature’s malice was directed specifically at him or her or at least 
at his or her class of cases.  
Once the intent requirement was raised to such alpine heights, 
the Court ended up with this perverse result: Policies that in their 
effects discriminate against blacks can be successfully challenged 
only by proving discriminatory intent by standards almost 
impossible to satisfy. But programs benefiting blacks and Latinos 
are subjected to a scrutiny so strict that almost none can meet it, at 
least for constitutional equal protection claims, including those from 
other social domains such as education.248  
B. White Advantage: Wygant v. Board of Education 
A recurrent theme in employment discrimination cases is white 
innocence.249 This motif was broached in the raucous politics of the 
northern anti-busing effort in the early ‘70s, where angry middle- 
and lower-class whites complained that they were forced to bear all 
the costs of desegregation while the elites who mandated the 
program sent their children to private schools and thereby evaded 
those burdens.250 White ethnics commonly complained that their 
ancestors either had nothing to do with slavery and were indeed in 
some ways as badly off as enslaved people or had migrated to 
America after the abolition of slavery.251 Either way, neither living 
whites nor their deceased forebears bore any responsibility for the 
                                                                                                             
 245. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 281, 292 (1987). 
 246. Id. at 298.   
 247. Id. at 292.   
 248. Among the few that did were Bakke and Grutter. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 249. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 
297 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative 
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). 
 250. RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ETHNICITY IN THE 1960S AND 1970S (1991). 
 251. Id.  
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sufferings and deprivations of blacks, so it was unjust to force them 
to compensate for black losses by being deprived of opportunities 
that they had a racially based right to expect.252 A noisy proponent 
of these views was an Italian-American law professor who 
denounced WASP exploitation of his hardworking immigrant 
father.253 Drawing on that supposed experience, he categorized 
“white ethnic groups” as the real victims of discrimination who 
were now having the burdens of racial justice foisted upon them.254 
“I owe no man anything, nor he me, because of the blood that flows 
in our veins,” he trumpeted.255 Professor Antonin Scalia would soon 
have an opportunity to translate his sentiments into constitutional 
law. 
The idea quickly migrated from the streets to the courts. Justice 
Powell was the first to invoke white innocence in his Bakke opinion 
of 1978: “There is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons 
in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances 
not of their making.”256 From there the theme of white innocence 
returned in one form or another in most affirmative action 
employment cases. The conservative wing of the Burger Court 
found the innocence theme irresistible and mandated a balancing of 
equities between black employees who had actually suffered from 
discriminatory employment practices and white employees 
“innocent of any wrongdoing.”257  
The trope of white innocence proved decisive in a case that is 
second only to Davis in demonstrating how the Supreme Court 
protects structural racism: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.258 
Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality opinion in that case is a systematic 
compendium of the legal–doctrinal affirmation of structural 
racism.259 The facts of Wygant provide a case study of how 
structural racism operates.260 A substantial minority of the residents 
of Jackson, a medium-sized city in southern Michigan, were people 
                                                                                                             
 252. Id. 
 253. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond 
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race”, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 153 
(1979). 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id.  
 256. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978).  
 257. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977); 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).  
 258. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).  
 259. See id. The Court was fractured: Powell delivered a plurality opinion 
joined by Burger, Rehnquist, and in part by O’Connor; O’Connor wrote a 
concurring opinion; White concurred only in the judgment; Marshall, joined by 
Brennan and Blackmun, dissented; and Stevens dissented separately. See id. 
 260. See id. 
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of color, but the city had a long history of racial discrimination in 
hiring them as teachers.261 To deal with simmering racial tensions in 
the schools, respondent Board of Education negotiated a contract 
with the teachers’ union providing that if layoffs became necessary, 
they would honor seniority, except that minority layoffs would not 
exceed the extant ratio of minority employees overall.262  
When layoffs came, the effect of this provision was that some of 
the most junior white teachers were laid off before some junior 
black teachers.263 The Court was therefore faced with the choice of 
either affirming a nominally race-neutral seniority system that 
would disproportionately lay off black teachers, or a race-conscious, 
negotiated agreement that would result in the preservation of recent, 
modest, and hard-won gains in minority hiring. Either it did not 
occur to the Powell bloc that a last-hired-first-fired policy would 
reduce the already thin ranks of black teachers, who were 
disproportionately few because of recent overt discrimination or 
they deemed it of no significance. If the burdens of an economic 
downturn were not proportionately shared by whites and blacks, the 
automatic operation of the seniority system (established in a context 
of racial discrimination) would cause white–black teacher ratios to 
revert back toward Jim Crow era levels, without any need for 
current racial animus to produce the disparate results. The system 
blindly, automatically, and invisibly generated racially disparate 
outcomes that shoved blacks out of recently gained employment 
opportunities. That is structural racism. 
Perhaps sensing this, the lower courts upheld the layoff 
agreement, emphasizing that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to 
prove intentional racial discrimination.264 District Judge Charles W. 
Joiner acknowledged the reality of what he called “societal 
discrimination” and the consequent need for black “role models” for 
minority students.265 The Supreme Court plurality would have none 
of this. “This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification,” Powell rebuked the 
lower court judges.266 The sole doctrinal function of racially 
                                                                                                             
 261. Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that no blacks were hired to teach 
in the public schools until 1954. Id. at 297 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In 1969, 
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 262. Id. at 270–71. 
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disparate outcomes was to suggest (though not prove) intentional 
discrimination. Powell dismissed without consideration the 
possibility of ever demonstrating structural racism: “Societal 
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing 
a racially classified remedy.”267 O’Connor concurred: “A 
governmental agency’s interest in remedying ‘societal’ 
discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own 
actions,” can never satisfy the compelling-interest element of the 
strict scrutiny test.268 
Once unmoored from social realities, the Court drifted off into 
airy speculation that had no statistical grounding: “Societal 
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive” and remedying it 
would harm “innocent people,” Justice Powell wrote.269 “There are 
numerous explanations for a disparity between the percentage of 
minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of 
them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.”270 Having 
thereby foreclosed the possibility of linking doctrine to social 
reality, the Court has never turned back to rethink its indifference to 
structural forces. Instead, it withdraws into a fantasy world of 
wishful or magical thinking: “Absent employment discrimination by 
the school board, ‘nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time 
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and 
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which 
employees are hired.’”271 The Court’s enthusiasm for this idea has 
not been diminished by the fact that it has no basis in reality and no 
evidence that such a desirable outcome has ever occurred. 
In her Wygant concurrence, O’Connor reformulated the strict 
scrutiny requirement to soften its impact but nevertheless injected 
the theme of white innocence again: An affirmative action program 
may not “impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or 
unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals.”272  
Those who, like Powell and O’Connor, voice concern about 
harm to innocent victims invariably refer to white victims; they 
                                                                                                             
U.S. at 274 and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468 (1989))). “Societal 
discrimination” is the Court’s term for its understanding of a form of racism 
beyond that of individual bigotry. 
 267. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
 268. Id. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 269. Id. at 276. 
 270. Id. Justice Powell did not think it necessary to identify any of these 
explanations.  
 271. Id. at 274–75 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 340 (1977)). The justices seem enamored of this quote; they used it again in 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977). 
 272. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Powell also adverted 
to white innocence. See id. at 281–82. 
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ignore the harm done by structural racism to innocent black 
individuals and groups. In the innocence trope, the victims are 
always (though implicitly) white. This is not a matter of overt 
racism but rather of white normativity: To be white is to be 
automatically exempt from all burdens of unjust discrimination, 
intentional or structural. When whites do not receive a hoped-for 
opportunity that they believe is rightfully theirs (protections for 
seniority on the job, admission to a public university), then by 
definition they must be victims of some kind of unjust and 
discriminatory policy. If whites and blacks are seen to be locked in a 
zero-sum game, where gains for one come at the expense of the 
other, then it seems intuitive that whites, individually and 
collectively presumed to be “innocent” of actions that have 
contributed to black oppression, are treated unfairly if they miss an 
opportunity where an affirmative action program is in place. It may 
be intuitive, but it is erroneous. Careful studies have demonstrated 
that whites stand no better chance of being admitted to selective 
educational institutions when no affirmative action program is in 
place than they do under such a program.273 When she invoked 
innocence, Justice O’Connor was obviously not thinking about 
innocent blacks who suffer the effects of structural racism.  
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor seemed to suggest that the 
strict scrutiny test, in either its uncompromising Scalia version or 
her softer one,274 can operate only in situations of Pareto 
inefficiency,275 where it is still possible to make some (blacks) better 
                                                                                                             
 273. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic 
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2002); WILLIAM G. 
BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (2000). White 
disappointment is almost always a result of the highly competitive character of the 
admissions process at such institutions. See Liu, supra, at 1046 n.8. The 
“causation fallacy” posits that if one black is admitted, one white will lose that 
opportunity. Id. at 1046. In reality, the disappointed white missed out because of 
the large number of whites with superior qualifications to him or her in the 
candidate pool. Id. at 1052–54. He or she probably would not have been admitted 
anyway, even if no affirmative action program were in place. Id. This presents a 
potentially fatal standing problem when whites challenge affirmative action 
programs, but the Supreme Court has carefully avoided looking into that issue. Id. 
at 1058–59. 
 274. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 275. “[U]nder certain specified conditions[,] . . . every competitive market 
equilibrium is ‘Pareto efficient’ (also called ‘Pareto optimal’). A state of affairs is 
defined as Pareto efficient if it is the case that compared with it, no one’s utility 
can be raised without reducing someone else’s utility.” Amartya Sen, Markets and 
Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting 
Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519, 521 (1993). Sen uses 
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off while not disadvantaging anyone else (whites). If that is so, then 
once Pareto optimality is reached—no one can be made better off 
without someone being made worse off—the abstract logic of strict 
scrutiny would seem to prohibit any further efforts to meliorate the 
effects of employment discrimination. In one sense, this is merely a 
fancy way of suggesting that whites will oppose any affirmative 
action program that imposes any costs at all on them. Or, to put it 
another way, the white majority will accede to black gains only if 
they come cost-free (to whites).276 But if the strict scrutiny test 
comes with some embedded but unstated Pareto-efficient upper 
limit, it will severely cripple any affirmative-action effort—which is 
exactly what happened after 1986. 
The white-innocence assumption leads to the logical error of 
false symmetry, a modern version of Anatole France’s “bridges of 
Paris” argument.277 The flawed assumptions, when unpacked, go as 
follows: For more than three centuries, blacks suffered overt, 
explicit oppression under slavery and then in post-Reconstruction 
servitude. To remediate that in the Civil Rights Era, laws attempted 
to open up opportunities for them and abolish the lingering effects of 
past discrimination. To this, whites responded with a claim of 
“reverse discrimination”: it is now they, innocent whites, who are 
victims of overt oppression.278 Thus, as there is an equivalence of 
wrongs, so there must be an equivalence of remedies. If we prohibit 
oppression of blacks, we must now prohibit the “oppression” that 
whites suffer by losing white advantage as blacks are given equal 
access to opportunities. But this is far-fetched, the logical fallacy of 
false equivalence again; no white person is discriminated against as 
blacks were until recently. They lose only the monopoly of benefit 
                                                                                                             
“utility” here in the economist’s sense of “well-being.” “A Pareto optimum occurs 
where it is impossible to make any individual better off without making someone 
else worse off. Pareto optimums are also said to be Pareto efficient.”  ROBIN P. 
MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET 
CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 189 (2004).  
 276. This would affirm Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” thesis. See 
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 277. “The majestic equality of the laws, which prohibits the rich as well as 
the poor from sleeping under bridges, from begging on the streets, and from 
stealing bread.” ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE 118 (1894) (authors’ 
translation). This bridges-of-Paris (“les ponts”) argument is a commonplace 
cultural referent to the concept of false symmetry, equating two things that are 
not identical.  
 278. Whites now consider bias against white people as a greater social problem 
than bias against blacks. See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See 
Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 215 (2011). 
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that had been provided by overt racism and the preferred or 
exclusive access that comes with white advantage, together with the 
lingering residues of unearned privilege and opportunity.  
The Wygant plurality dismissed out of hand a justification for 
affirmative action plans that promoted black teachers as role models 
for their students.279 White normativity made it impossible for the 
plurality to see how vital role models were to people who had 
previously experienced barriers to opportunity automatically erected 
because of their race. It did not seem to occur to the justices that 
black teachers would be role models not only for black students but, 
as importantly, for white students as well. Underlying this is an 
assumption that white students will have a whole and complete view 
of the world with only white faculty—an example of the 
unexamined belief that white advantage is normative.280 Powell 
instead imposed a linkage between role models and quotas or 
percentages. He insisted that the role-model theory would lead to 
“discriminatory hiring and layoff” policies that would have “no 
logical stopping point” and would be “ageless in their reach into the 
past and timeless in their ability to affect the future.”281 There was 
no logical connection between the importance of role models and 
quotas, nor was it necessary to inject one. The Board could have 
justified retention of black teachers without demanding 
proportionality. But the majority’s unthinking impatience with the 
role model idea deprived equality advocates of an essential 
argument for affirmative action. 
Thus, the Court sees innocence only in whites and is oblivious 
as to how its perception of innocence is blind to the innocence of 
people of color. Similarly, the Court sees faculty role models only in 
whites; because faculty have traditionally been white, white faculty 
role models became normative. This is white advantage in action. 
C. Individualism: Wygant (Again) 
Justice Powell was at pains to refute Justice Marshall’s lengthy 
dissent in Wygant and challenged one of its core ideas: Marshall 
“sees this case not in terms of individual constitutional rights, but as 
an allocation of burdens ‘between two racial groups.’”282 Powell 
retorted: “This is really nothing more than group-based analysis.”283 
                                                                                                             
 279. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986). 
 280. Robert St. Martin Westley, White Normativity and the Rhetoric of Equal 
Protection, in EXISTENCE IN BLACK: AN ANTHOLOGY OF BLACK EXISTENTIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 97–98, (Lewis R. Gordon ed. 1997). 
 281. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275–76. 
 282. Id. at 281 n.8. 
 283. Id. 
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“The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be 
distributed like bloc [sic] grants within discrete racial groups . . . .”284 
But that assumed the very point in controversy. To deal with 
structural racism, we—and the Court—must think in group terms 
because it is groups, not individuals, who have been the principal 
focus of racialized societies.  
Justice Scalia thus got it exactly wrong when he wrote that 
“[t]he relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or Irish 
who were discriminated against, but it was individual men and 
women, ‘created equal,’ who were discriminated against.”285 
Similarly, Justice Thomas perverted the meaning of Brown v. Board 
of Education I when he claimed that “[a]t the heart of this 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that 
the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as 
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”286 If we do not think 
in terms of groups, structural racism will remain invisible to all of 
us. Powell and his successors refuse to concede that and maintain 
that only individuals may be rights claimants: “[T]he petitioners 
before us today are not ‘the white teachers as a group.’ They are 
Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim that they were fired 
from their jobs because of their race.”287 Thus the hyper-
individualism that infects American law generally has a particularly 
distorting effect here, disabling us from seeing the true nature of 
inequality in American life. Sociologists have identified this 
insistence on individualism as a key component of structural 
racism.288 
D. Superficial Neutrality: The Annus Horribilis of 1989 
Though the Court’s equal protection agenda did not shrink after 
1989, few major constitutionally based employment claims like 
those discussed above came before the High Court,289 as the 
justices’ attentions shifted to policing racial gerrymanders and 
shutting down school integration efforts. But 1989 was an active 
terminal year for constitutional workplace discrimination litigation 
                                                                                                             
 284. Id.  
 285. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  
 286. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 287. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281 n.8. 
 288. See supra Part II.2. 
 289. Though not from the lower federal courts. See Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432 fig. 1 (2004). 
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in the High Court, as four major decisions further embedded 
structural racism by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to identify 
it and seek the law’s aid in rooting it out.290 Three of these cases 
dealt with procedural questions, which concealed their significance 
for lay people.291 But they were precursors of a trend that has 
characterized the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: the use of 
procedural innovations to make employment discrimination cases 
more difficult to succeed.292 The technique of restricting or negating 
substantive rights by erecting devious, technical, procedural hurdles 
characterized both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, providing its 
conservative members with a stealthy way to frustrate rights claims 
that they opposed, without incurring the odium that open and direct 
attacks on the rights themselves might invite.293 These technical, 
procedural hurdles are examples of the structural arrangements 
embedded in social and organizational infrastructure that appear to 
be neutral. Their assumed neutrality causes them to be invisible; 
they are nonetheless effective in perpetuating racial disparities. 
Through a quarter-century of litigation, the federal courts had 
worked out a series of rules for allocating the burdens of proof and 
persuasion in Title VII cases. But in a case that was coeval with this 
Title VII litigation,294 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a five-
justice majority made what Justice Stevens’s dissent called “changes 
in [those] elementary and eminently fair rules,” making it extremely 
difficult for plaintiffs to win Title VII disparate impact cases.295 An 
Alaska salmon cannery employed two tiers of workers: white-collar 
and skilled technical workers, who were nearly all white, and 
unskilled cannery floor workers, who were predominantly Filipino 
                                                                                                             
 290. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The 
significance of this quartet was obscured by the blockbuster affirmative action 
case of that term, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 291. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642; Martin, 490 U.S. 755; Hopkins, 40 U.S. 
228.  
 292. See Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-
2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 253–
56 (2009). 
 293. For examples from the Roberts Court of this use of procedure to foil 
substance, which lie beyond the chronological scope of this Article, see id.; see 
also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007).  
 294. The Wards Cove litigation had gone on for 24 years before it reached 
the Supreme Court. See James v. American International Recovery, Inc., 799 F. 
Supp. 1156, 1167 (1992). 
 295. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 679 (1989). 
(Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
2014] STRUCTURAL RACISM IN THE WORKPLACE 1151 
 
 
 
and Alaska Native.296 Justice White for the majority rejected 
evidence based on that racial imbalance, mandating instead that 
plaintiff must prove “a specific or particular employment practice 
that has created the disparate impact,” even though he conceded that 
the new requirement would be “unduly burdensome.”297 This 
insistence on identifying specific employment practices as the cause 
of disparate impacts arises from a misunderstanding of racism as 
existing only in the form of individual bigotry. It betrays the Court’s 
misunderstanding of how the superficial neutrality of social 
structures and policies produce racial disparities. It also reveals the 
Court’s misunderstanding of how structural racism arises from the 
interactions between various social structures and policies. To 
conclude that racism was not taking place at the cannery just 
because overt racism was not in evidence was to ignore the reality 
that structural racism was silently operating to produce the same 
disparate outcome. Any number of factors itemized above as 
examples of structural racism in the workplace could have been 
functioning either singly or in combination to produce such a racial 
disparity in employment. These factors could include: selectively 
disseminating information about job openings or using social 
networks to disseminate such information; requiring previous job 
experience for cannery jobs historically held only by whites; and 
unconscious attitudes about candidates’ skills and aptitudes affecting 
hiring decisions, as well as supervisors’ perceptions of employee 
behavior with respect to job performance.298 The Court’s newly 
mandated tight linkage between “a particular practice” and results 
would make proof of discrimination virtually impossible.  
Wards Cove was a major setback for voluntary affirmative 
action programs.299 This led Justice Blackmun in dissent to lament 
that in the conditions of such a “plantation economy” as that of the 
cannery, with a proven track record of confining non-whites to 
lower-paid unskilled positions, “[o]ne wonders whether the majority 
still believes that race discrimination—or, more accurately, race 
discrimination against nonwhites—is a problem in our society, or 
even remembers that it ever was.”300 This apparently stung the 
majority. Justice White in a footnote dismissed Blackmun’s critique 
as “hyperbolic.”301 Merely because “race discrimination” is 
                                                                                                             
 296. Id. at 646–48. 
 297. Id. at 657.  
 298. See supra Part II.B.  
 299. Michael Braswell et al., Disparate Impact Theory in the Aftermath of 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: Burdens of Proof, Statistical Evidence, and 
Affirmative Action, 54 ALB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). 
 300. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 301. Id. at 649 n.4. 
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extensive in the United States, White averred, “does not mean, 
however, that it exists at the canneries—or more precisely, that it 
has been proved to exist at the canneries.”302 
Martin v. Wilks, another in the endless procession of white 
firefighter suits, provided another example of achieving substantive 
results—here, weakening consent decrees that had settled Title VII 
actions—through procedural maneuvers that would be invisible or 
incomprehensible to casual lay observers.303 In litigation dating back 
to 1974, black firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama, reached a 
consent decree with their municipal employer that mandated 
remedies for an admitted history of racial discrimination.304 These 
provided specific goals for the hiring and promotion of black 
firefighters.305 A group of white firefighters who had declined to 
participate in the original litigation and hence were not parties to the 
consent decree then sued to challenge promotions based on the 
consent decrees as “reverse discrimination” that denied them 
advancement opportunities because of their race.306 Normally, a 
party who chooses not to assert his or her right in some litigation 
that might affect his or her situation is precluded from challenging 
the result.307 A majority speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist 
nevertheless permitted the white firefighters to challenge the consent 
decrees by making an exception to the decades-long-standing 
procedural rules regarding impermissible collateral attack.308 The 
decision cast a long shadow, threatening disruption of existing 
consent arrangements and discouraging future use of the consent 
decree by injecting an element of uncertainty and lack of finality 
into any settlement. 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union was both a substantive and 
procedural setback for African Americans seeking to challenge 
workplace discrimination.309 Brenda Patterson brought an action 
                                                                                                             
 302. Id.  
 303. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan, and 
Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 304. Id. at 758. 
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 760. 
 307. See id. at 762 n.3 and authorities cited therein. This is known as 
“impermissible collateral attack.” The non-participating parties are said to be 
“sitting on the sidelines” and are precluded from getting into the game after it is 
over.  
 308. See id. at 791–93. 
 309. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
Court had earlier alarmed civil rights advocates by sua sponte ordering 
reargument on the question of whether it should reverse its earlier decision in 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which held section 1981 covered 
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under 42 U.S.C § 1981 claiming that she had been denied promotion 
and fired because of her race.310 Section 1981, descended from 
section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,311 guarantees that “all 
persons . . . have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts” 
as whites.312 The defendant argued, and a five-justice majority 
agreed, that this language applied only to initial hiring decisions and 
did not cover subsequent discriminatory acts.313 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy soothingly suggested that the plaintiff still had remedies 
available to her under Title VII because it was a later and more 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.314 Thus “we may preserve the 
integrity of Title VII‘s procedures without sacrificing any significant 
coverage of the civil rights laws.”315 But that was cold comfort 
because section 1981 created an action for damages, thus providing 
a stronger deterrent to workplace racism, while Title VII authorized 
only an award of back pay.316 The kinds of discrimination Patterson 
alleged could not be rectified by back-pay awards. Moreover, as 
Justice Brennan argued in dissent, a capacious reading of section 
1981 was more consonant with the Framers’ intentions and the spirit 
of the First Reconstruction when it was originally enacted.317 
In its 1989 cases, the Court read expansive and empowering 
statutes in a crabbed, stingy way, formally and hypertechnically 
draining off their transformative potential. The justices treated the 
ideal of equality as a matter of politics rather than constitutionality, 
tweaking supposedly neutral procedures to attain outcomes 
benefiting white plaintiffs but thwarting litigants of color. The effect 
was to enable whites and white institutions to maintain the racial 
status quo.318  
The 1989 decisions were so egregious that Congress felt obliged 
to intervene. Noting that the Supreme Court had cut back 
dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights 
protections in a series of its recent decisions, the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                             
private conduct. Patterson, 485 U.S. at 617. It prudently decided in Patterson to 
decline that radical move. The reargument attracted a galaxy of eminent counsel 
on both sides of that issue on brief and as amici. 
 310. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 168. 
 311. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  
 312. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 1981). 
 313. Id. at 176. 
 314. Id. at 181. 
 315. Id. at 181–82. 
 316. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1989) (discussing damages); id. § 2000e(5) 
(discussing back pay). 
 317. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 191–200 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 318. Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 
TUL. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1990). 
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1991 overturned each of the four decisions.319 Rejecting Patterson, 
it expanded section 1981’s “make and enforce contracts” provisions 
to include performance, modification, termination, and enjoyment of 
benefits and explicitly stated that the statute applied to private 
discrimination.320 It explicitly overruled Wards Cove by name.321 It 
reaffirmed the disparate impact strand of Title VII but produced a 
weak compromise on the business-necessity defense.322 It made the 
employer’s independent-motive defense inapplicable to issues of per 
se liability.323 It removed the ability of non-parties to upset a consent 
decree if they were adequately represented by the original parties or 
knew or should have known of the proceedings.324 Finally, it 
affirmed the Griggs validation of a disparate impact reading of Title 
VII.325 For good measure, it also authorized punitive damages for 
malicious discrimination.326 Seldom has Congress so decisively 
rebuked the justices’ overreaching, though the statute itself was 
vague and the consequences ineffective and disappointing.327 
E. Colorblindness: The Anticlassification Principle 
Current readings of Brown v. Board of Education differ as to the 
exact nature of the right established by that case. Is it the right of 
people of color to be free of an oppressive disability imposed on 
                                                                                                             
 319. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 pt. 2, at 1 (1991); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. President George H. W. Bush vetoed the 
measure in 1990, disparaging it as a “quota bill.” Steven A. Holmes, President 
Vetoes Bill on Job Rights: Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1990), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/23/us/president-vetoes-bill-on-job-
rights-showdown-is-set.html [http://perma.cc/V26R-7L8U] (archived Apr. 10, 
2014).  
 320. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 101, Plub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 
1072. 
 321. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.  
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 “reversed” Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the fourth of the 1989 employment 
discrimination suits. In Price Waterhouse, a plurality (uncharacteristically 
speaking through Justice Brennan) determined that when an employee proved 
that gender (or race) played a role in employment decisions, his or her employer 
could avoid liability by showing that it had an independent reason for its actions. 
Id. The plurality held that such a showing would constitute a complete defense 
to the action. Id. 
 324. § 108, 105 Stat. at 1076.  
 325. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. Justice Scalia has suggested that he would like 
to overturn the Griggs’s validation of a disparate-impact reading of Title VII. 
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 326. See § 1977A, 105 Stat. at 1073. 
 327. JEB BARNES, OVERRULED: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND 
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 12–15 (2004). 
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them by the State, a denial of opportunity that made them something 
less than full citizens? Scholars commonly refer to that reading as the 
“antisubordination value.”328 Or is it instead something much more 
narrow and shallow: a right not to have the State determine one’s 
opportunities in society by an arbitrary classification, such as the 
chimera of race? That is known as the “anticlassification value.”329 
By 1976, as conservatives began to complain of “reverse 
discrimination” in response to affirmative action programs, scholars 
began to explore the differing potentials presented by these 
inconsistent interpretations. Owen Fiss contended that Brown should 
be read as a guarantee against oppression, recognizing groups as 
rights-holders.330 Paul Brest endorsed what he called “the 
antidiscrimination principle” (referred to here as “antisubordination”) 
as a “prohibition[] of race-dependent decisions that disadvantage the 
members of minority groups.”331 But an ambivalence blurred Brest’s 
formulation: “[T]he antidiscrimination principle disfavors race-
dependent decisions and conduct—at least when they selectively 
disadvantage the members of a minority group.”332 This formulation, 
stripped of the qualifying “at least” phrase, can be taken out of 
context to become the naked anticlassification principle. As Fiss and 
Brest wrote in 1976, the Supreme Court was beginning to accept the 
anticlassification reading as canonical for the understanding of equal 
protection.333 This blunted Brown’s potential for social transformation 
and redirected its moral energies to protecting whites’ opportunities. 
Anticlassification is not merely a counterpoint perspective to 
antisubordination. Antisubordination reflects the widely shared 
understanding that sociologists have developed for more than 40 
years of how structural processes produce racial disparities. We 
must openly acknowledge the racial imbalance inherent in structural 
forces and take overt racially explicit steps to counter them. 
Anticlassification, on the other hand, spurns these findings in the 
fields of both sociology and psychology. It is a lawyer’s and judge’s 
construct, not a social scientist’s, based on no more than fanciful or 
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wishful speculation about how some notional society ought to work. 
Anticlassification is the judicial formulation of colorblindness.  
In the generation since Fiss and Brest wrote, a majority of the 
justices have endorsed the anticlassification approach over 
antisubordination, with disastrous results.334 If Brown means 
nothing more than that the State may not classify by race and if that 
rubric is applied mechanically, then all race-conscious efforts to 
ameliorate present legacies of racial oppression in the past may be 
held unconstitutional. If the justices continue to insist on clinging to 
the notion of anticlassification—which is completely disconnected 
from the reality of structural and unconscious racism—then we are 
left with the banal formalism of: “The way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” a 
bumper sticker trying to pass itself off as a constitutional apercu.335 
This approach spells disaster not only for efforts to achieve a level 
playing field in employment but also dooms Grutter v. Bollinger to 
reversal and condemns future generations to replicate an inescapably 
racist society.336  
The anticlassification reading favored by the Burger, Rehnquist, 
and Roberts Courts has at least two malignant effects. First, it 
inverts the original meaning of Brown v. Board of Education and 
subverts the work of those who enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The justices who produced Brown and the Congress that 
passed the 1964 Act understood that they were putting an end to an 
entire social system in which the dominant and privileged white race 
used its power to strip African Americans of opportunity, civic 
status, and dignity. After Brown, the Equal Protection Clause was 
read to prevent official status degradation. The Court’s holdings 
during the Second Reconstruction, 1954–1970, were mostly 
consistent with this understanding. When the 39th Congress adopted 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867 and sent it out to the states for 
ratification, the members intended to protect blacks from the 
oppressions of whites. When the Fifteenth Amendment banned 
deprivation of the vote “on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude,”337 the Framers were again being race-
specific, protecting blacks. Anticlassification readings ignore the 
Framers’ solicitude for the freed people and substitute a faux 
constitutional understanding under which government may not take 
race into account, either to oppress or to protect and equalize.  
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Second, the anticlassification reading provides an effective 
doctrinal cover for structural racism in all social domains. If the 
canonical meaning of the 20th century’s most important Supreme 
Court decision is shrunk to the puny and sterile mantra that 
government may not classify by race, then the only effective 
remedial actions that the federal and state governments may take to 
combat the lingering effects of all forms of racism will be 
illegitimate. In order to deal with the structural effects of workplace 
inequality, for example, government action must not only be 
proactive but also explicitly race conscious. The claims of moral 
equivalence are specious and rest on the fallacy of false symmetry: 
The races do not stand on an equal footing with respect to three-and-
a-half centuries of oppression.338 Whites enslaved blacks, not the 
other way around; whites imposed Jim Crow on blacks, not the 
reverse. Whites continue to benefit in countless ways from past 
discrimination; blacks do not. Classification by race is essential if 
remedies are to be effective and trying to avoid it by the self-
deception of colorblindness only perpetuates the wrongs of the past. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court decisions since 1964 involving constitutional 
challenges to employment discrimination have mapped precisely 
onto the template of structural racism. These decisions exemplify 
components of structural racism, thereby cementing it into the social 
foundations of America. Therefore, one might reasonably conclude 
that the Court has ignored structural analysis. In reality though, the 
justices have actually demonstrated that they do think in structural 
terms—but only to protect whites’ interests. 
This began in Washington v. Davis, where Justice White rejected 
the Griggs statutory criterion of disparate impact for constitutional 
interpretation.339 But with unintended irony, he justified his 
conclusion by a results-oriented test that amounted to a policy-
grounded disparate impact test for white people: A holding for the 
petitioners “would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions 
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public 
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more 
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affluent white.”340 For the first but not the last time, the Supreme 
Court applied a racial double standard for the Davis purpose and 
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effects test: Where the status quo of white advantage is threatened, 
the Court relies on the effects on whites with no requirement of 
proving malevolent intent. But where blacks challenge policies that 
disadvantage them, the Court demands proof of wrongful intent 
under a standard that became ever more daunting. Programs 
benefiting people of color are subjected to impossibly strict scrutiny. 
This began a consistent pattern where the justices refused to do 
structural analysis when the interests of blacks are adversely 
affected. At the same time, they invoked structural considerations to 
protect whites’ opportunities and prevent disrupting the status quo of 
wealth distribution. Under the Washington v. Davis effects test, all 
that white plaintiffs need to do to challenge an affirmative action 
plan is to demonstrate that they will lose an opportunity (an effect), 
with no need to demonstrate malignant intent. But blacks 
challenging discrimination must prove intent under Davis by 
standards that are usually impossible to meet.  
People of color asserting a denial of equal protection now face at 
least four daunting obstacles: 
First, the justices mandate a showing of intent for black 
plaintiffs, which, under the doctrinal progression from Davis to 
Feeney to McCleskey, is now effectively unattainable. Conversely, 
the Court permits white plaintiffs to focus solely on the effects on 
them.   
Second, the Court accords only to whites an important 
advantage: the mantle of innocence. While the Court has repeatedly 
presented itself since Bakke as the paladin of white innocence, the 
majority (excluding Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun) has 
been unable to see people of color as innocent victims—victims of 
centuries of slavery followed by post-emancipation servitude, with 
effects that still dominate our society. In the Civil Rights Cases, 
Justice Joseph Bradley demanded that African Americans no longer 
be “the special favorite of the laws” (as if they ever had been).341 
But American law has always treated white people as the favorites 
of the law and continues to do so by securing the structural 
advantages of whiteness, including innocence and victimhood.  
Third, the Court’s majority insists that only individual people of 
color, not groups, can be victims of racial injustice and remedies 
may only be for individual people of color. The justices have grown 
increasingly hostile to remedies covering groups and restrict the 
procedural avenues, such as the class action, that make group 
remedies possible at all. Yet the justices approve group remedies, 
but for whites only, whenever they invalidate programs or actions 
taken to overcome effects of past discrimination in employment. 
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Most recently in Ricci v. Stefano, for example, a five-justice 
majority held that the employer’s decision to discard the results of a 
civil service examination required for firefighters’ promotions 
constituted a “racial preference” in favor of black candidates.342 It 
thereby converted whites’ disappointment and inconvenience in 
retaking the exam into the basis for a finding of “intentional 
discrimination.”343 The white plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a group 
remedy, though they had demonstrated neither intent to discriminate 
nor individualized harm. 
Fourth, the Court placed nearly insurmountable obstacles to 
awarding damages for black plaintiffs presenting constitutional 
claims, by the narrowest possible reading of section 1981 in 
Patterson v. McLean.344 Yet the Court has reduced standing 
requirements for whites claiming personal injury (such as in 
Wygant), merely presuming injury rather than requiring white 
plaintiffs to show tight causal linkages.  
Besides applying differential criteria to black and white 
plaintiffs, the justices have repeatedly rejected the possibility of 
basing claims on what they term “societal racism”—the 
pervasiveness of racial discrimination throughout American society. 
Yet, ironically—given the Court’s insistence on applying to black 
plaintiffs the traditional paradigm of racism limited to overt 
individual bigotry—the Court accords to white plaintiffs the benefit 
of a structural perspective that focuses attention:  
• on groups and away from individuals;  • on effects on those groups as opposed to injury to 
individuals;  • on assumed injury to each member of the group as a 
result of the aggregate effect on the group, as opposed to 
a demand for demonstration of injury to each individual; 
and • on inadvertent effects of institutional policies and 
procedures as opposed to insistence on evidence of intent 
to discriminate.  
The Court has indeed been using a structural understanding of 
racism sub rosa—but has applied this structural approach only to 
whites. We draw two conclusions here: First, the Court does in fact 
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understand how structural elements affect racial advantage and 
disadvantage; and second, the Court has not adhered to its self-
professed belief in colorblindness when doing so might jeopardize 
some white interest. 
These opportunistic doctrinal inconsistencies suggest that 
attempts to meet the challenges of structural racism in the American 
society of the 21st century will fail if we do not move beyond the 
perspective of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and devise new doctrines 
for a new day. Just as laws designed to ban denial of suffrage on the 
basis of race are ineffectual to deal with modern suffrage restrictions 
like photo identification laws or reduced voting schedules, so the 
laws of a half-century ago predicated on overt discrimination in the 
workplace cannot meet the structural problems encountered by the 
Brenda Pattersons of our time. Colorblindness and anticlassification 
have led us down a one-way street: The justices forbid taking race 
into account when doing so would meliorate blacks’ situations by 
relieving the effects of past oppression. But they are alert to 
distinctions of color when necessary to protect white advantage. 
Fifty years on, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has done its work 
well. But it has proven effective only when deployed against an evil 
that was the only known evil of its time. Our challenge now is to go 
beyond the time-bound vision of 1964 to remove the roadblocks that 
the Supreme Court keeps erecting that frustrate the quest for racial 
justice. 
